Kelley Lynch Court Victim

Exhibit B: Whatever Happened to Kelley Lynch


Kelley Lynch is the woman accused in 2005 of skimming millions from singer Leonard Cohen’s retirement fund. I knew of her through friends of Leonard Cohen, and had heard her described in glowing terms as the agent who, single handedly, saved Cohen’s career in the 1990s.

In early May of this year, Lynch suddenly contacted me. She said she was mainly interested in my perceptions of Cohen as a former friend and next door neighbor in Montreal. At one time I also studied with his Zen Master in California, and had spent time with him on Hydra, Greece.

Not having heard her side of the story (I doubt that anyone has, apart from a circle of her closest friends), I was curious. Over the next few weeks, she shared several documents pertaining to the case including an affidavit written and signed by her older son, Rutger.

Together, they paint a picture very much at variance from the sketchy media image of Lynch as a reckless, delusional woman on the brink of a career meltdown. Lynch’s own timeline also includes disturbing behind-the-scene dealings that suggest she may have been set up to take the blame for Cohen’s tax situation.

The following account is based on what Lynch has sent me —

Since 2005 when she became the object of media gossip, little if anything has been heard from Kelley Lynch.

A single mother with two sons, Lynch was Leonard Cohen’s personal manager from approximately 1988 to 2004, and was known for her skill, hard work, and dedication. Until 2004, Kelley lived and worked in Los Angeles where she still has many friends and acquaintances in the entertainment world including Phil Spector and Oliver Stone.

Her own account of the events that wrecked her career, varies widely from the media portrait of a reckless, delusional woman in the throes of a personal meltdown. The meltdown was real, however. By late December, 2005, Lynch had lost custody of one son and was homeless and living on the streets with her older son, Rutger, who witnessed the chain of bizarre events that had begun a year earlier.

In 2004, Lynch owned a house in Brentwood, and still worked for Cohen, who owed her money for royalties and other services, but was increasingly involved with his new girlfriend, Anjani Thomas, ex-wife of Cohen’s attorney, Robert Kory.

In retrospect, Lynch believes she was set up by Cohen and his representatives to help cover up a tax situation which made the IRS “nervous.” In September 2004, Cohen’s attorney Weston told Lynch that a financial entity known as Traditional Holdings, LLC could be overturned by the IRS. Lynch, who had been selected as a partner on the entity, became uneasy and consulted a new accountant, who referred her to tax lawyers, who found irregularities in Cohen’s tax history, both in the US and Canada where he has residences.

Rattled by what she was hearing – that she was being dragged into criminal tax fraud — Lynch called the IRS in Washington and also contacted their website. An IRS collection agent advised her to call the Fraud Hotline, which she did.

Told that any further action on her part might implicate her in fraud, Lynch refused to meet with Cohen or turn over the corporate books. At that stage, Cohen’s advisers began claiming that certain payments, distributions, or advances made to her were actually “over-payments.” Lynch says their accounting was incomplete and ignored her share of intellectual property, unpaid commissions and royalties, and share in Traditional Holdings, LLC. Apparently Lynch had also been issued K1 partnership tax documents and made a partner on another Cohen investment entity, LC Investments, LLC, without her permission or awareness.

Lynch says an increasingly nervous and desperate Cohen was pressuring her to agree to mediation and told a friend of hers that Lynch was “the love of his life.” She and Cohen had had a brief affair in 1990, but Cohen now was offering her 50% of his “community property” as well as “palimony” through lawyer Robert Kory at a meeting attended by Lynch’s legal representatives and her accountant, Dale Burgess. To Lynch, none of this made sense at the time.

Meanwhile, the Los Angeles District Attorney’s office received an anonymous tip informing them that Lynch was a friend of producer Phil Spector, whom Lynch maintains is innocent. Cohen, on the other hand, had given an interview in which he described a gun-waving Spector who threatened him during recording sessions in 1977.

At around the same time he was offering her “millions”, Lynch says, Cohen was also circulating slanderous stories about her. She believes Cohen encouraged Los Angeles record producer Steve Lindsey, the father of her son Ray, to initiate a custody suit – on May 25, 2005, the same day a 25-man SWAT team from the LAPD, acting on a bogus 911 call, suddenly cordoned off her street and surrounded her home in response to a “hostage taking.”

Earlier that morning, Lynch says, her 12 year old son Ray woke up not feeling well. She sent an email to his school informing them she was keeping him at home. When the boy’s father found out Ray was home he became agitated and abusive over the phone to Lynch.

Lynch says she had young people who worked for her coming and going that day, and did not want Ray’s father coming to the house and attacking her, as he had in the past. She called her older son Rutger, who was visiting a friend nearby, and asked him to pick Ray up and take him down the hill where actress Cloris Leachman waited in her car. Leachman, a friend of Lindsey, took charge of Ray – just as seven LAPD squad cars came speeding up Mandeville Canyon Road in the direction of Lynch’s house. With them was Ray’s father, Steve Lindsey.

Lynch says she looked out the window and saw armed men on her lawn. Her son Rutger and his friends were telling police there was no hostage-taking, that they had spent the morning with Lynch, and that there must be some mistake. For reasons no one understands, LAPD/Inglewood PD decided to believe Steve Lindsey, who had left the scene.

Police later gave varying explanations about what led up to the incident. West LAPD said they responded to a report that someone heard “shots fired.” But a company that oversees SWAT said Lynch would have to have a superior caliber weapon to warrant such a high risk entry. A member of the SWAT team claimed to have seen a note that Lynch’s sister had placed the call stating Lynch posed “a danger to herself and everyone around her.” Her sister denies this.

Lynch stayed inside her house and called her former custody lawyer, Lee Kanon Alpert. She also called Leonard Cohen, assuming he had played a role in the events unfolding on her lawn. Lynch says she knew Steve Lindsey had also been meeting with Cohen and his attorney, and had recently told their son Ray that Lynch was “going to jail,” upsetting the boy. She says Cohen taped the phone call later used in his successful court case against her – for which, Lynch says, she never received a summons.

Lynch says, “Police were on my hillside and crouching under my kitchen window.” She says the standoff on her lawn continued for several more hours, disrupting the neighbourhood. Members of Inglewood Police Department also participated in the operation.

Eventually, she decided to go into the back yard. Seeing her son Rutger acting as a “human shield and hostage negotiator,” Lynch ventured out front with her Akita on leash and joked to the cops: “Who am I supposed to be holding hostage? My dog?”

The police responded by telling her son they would only shoot Lynch and her dog if necessary.

“That was when I dove into the pool.”

SWAT team members searched her house. As they entered, Lynch’s African Grey parrot, Lou, called out: “I see dead people!” – further alarming the nervous cops.

Offering her a hand out of the pool, one officer said they were only there to help her and not to hurt her.

“No one asked me if I was all right; no one questioned me about my well-being.” The Medical Examiners Office later wondered how the police had evaluated her. After stating they were not arresting her, they handcuffed Lynch, still in her bikini. On her way out the door, her son managed to hand her a brocade jacket.

Although she lived near UCLA Medical Center, she was taken in a squad car to King-Drew Medical Centre in Watts, 40 miles away and a three-hour drive in traffic. Known as one of America’s worst hospitals, King-Drew was recently closed down as a place where patients routinely die from neglect and medical errors. During the long ride through South Central Los Angeles, Lynch says she was questioned closely about her relationship with Phil Spector, who had been charged with first degree murder of Lana Clarkson. In the car, Lynch voiced concern over what awaited her at the hospital but was told by a woman cop: “This will be good for you.”

“I felt I was being kidnapped”.

At Emergency, the admitting psychiatrist administered anti-psychotic drugs without authorization and left Lynch in the waiting area for hours, still in her bikini and brocade jacket, and handcuffed to a chair. A nurse advised her she would be transferred – but did not tell her where. Examining her file, the nurse noticed it listed her as 19 years old with wrong social security number, wrong date of birth, wrong religion, and her name misspelled as “Kelly Lynch” Lynch thinks it was the same file she had seen, several months earlier, in the hands of the Special Investigator who came to question her about Spector.

A second doctor told her to wait her turn to ensure no further harm would come to her, and assured her that nothing in the King Drew report could cause her to lose custody of her child. The following day, she was released after nearly 24 hours in the psych ward.

Back home, Lynch learned that while she was being held at the hospital her younger son’s father, Steven Clark Lindsey, had filed for custody of her son Ray Charles Lindsey and obtained a restraining order denying her access to the boy. She says Lindsey attempted to convince doctors at King Drew that she was dangerous, in order to have her committed, She says Lindsey also threatened the psychiatrist who had her released.

On that same day, Cohen’s attorney Robert Kory filed a Declaration in the custody matter, as did Betsy Superfon (a friend of Cohen, Kory and Lindsey who had befriended Lynch a few months earlier ). Superfon later told Lynch she didn’t realize what she was signing, and that Cohen had offered Lindsey money “or something else” to take Ray away from Lynch.

Her older son alleges Lindsey offered him money to go to Leonard Cohen’s lawyer’s office and transfer or sign over Lynch’s house to Cohen or his attorney Robert Kory. Rutger refused and phoned his own father, who advised him to contact a lawyer.

Two weeks later, in early June, as she drove down her street to buy dog food, a Mercedes sped out of a neighbouring driveway and rear-ended her car, Lynch was thrown forward, fracturing her nose against the steering well, and was knocked unconscious. Later, she says, as she drove back up the hill to her home, the same driver was standing in his driveway and called out: “We are watching you” as she passed.

Seeing his injured, bleeding mother enter the house, her older son again phoned his father, who may have called 911. Accounts vary as whether the call referred to an incident of “domestic violence” or a “drug overdose.” Either way, police arrived at Lynch’s door for the second time in two weeks. Over the protests of her son, they entered while she was on the phone to a friend, Dr. Wendi Knaak who stayed on the phone talking with Rutger while police again handcuffed Lynch. This time they took her to UCLA hospital where her obvious head injuries were ignored. Instead, she was once again drugged and placed in the psychiatric unit where she remained for several days.

Lynch and her advisors maintain these events were coordinated by Cohen, Kory and Lindsey, with the help of former LA District Attorney Ira Reiner in a well- orchestrated plan to traumatize and discredit her – paving the way for media stories which accused her of skimming millions from Cohen’s retirement fund.

In the summer of 2005, as Lynch was struggling to save her home and protect her child from a father her friends describe as “viciously anti-social” and “violent”, reports of Leonard Cohen’s financial troubles hit the press. They alleged the 70-something singer had been scammed by his personal manager, Kelley Lynch, who colluded with an advisor at the AGILE Group in Colorado to send him false financial statements while emptying his accounts of millions of dollars.

Although listed as the owner of Traditional Holdings, the entity in question, Lynch says she never received any statements from the AGILE Group — who instead had been sending them to Cohen — having changed her mailing address to Cohen’s home in Los Angeles. She has since filed a complaint with the US Post Office for mail tampering.

NOTE: It appears that Leonard Cohen or one of his representatives changed Lynch’s mailing address from her home to Cohen’s home in Los Angeles. She filed a complaint with USPS.

She insists Cohen sued her because she went to the IRS about his tax situation. She says he is not, and never was, “broke” and that missing funds went to buy homes for his son Adam Cohen and girlfriend, singer Anjani Thomas, ex-wife of Robert Kory. Noting Cohen is famous for his financial largesse and once gave Zen Master Sasaki Roshi $500,000 as a gift, Lynch also cites hefty payments to advisers, various transaction fees, personal taxes, and other monies which may have been sent offshore.

While Cohen and Lindsey attempted to persuade others, including LA Superior Court, that she intended to flee to Tibet or another non-extradition country, Lynch was isolated and penniless and still in Los Angeles. Lynch was former personal secretary to the late Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche, a flamboyant Tibetan spiritual teacher who founded Naropa Institute in Boulder, Colorado in the 1970s, and died in 1987. She says various Tibetan lamas are praying for her safety.

NOTE: Lynch was a student of Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche and helped raise his son Gesar Mukpo.Lynch was Kusum Lingpa Rinpoche’s personal assistant and is his lineage holder.

Journalists covering the story were either unable, or didn’t bother, to track Lynch down, and most reported Cohen’s statements as fact. The NY Times contacted Kelley for a quote which they never printed

By July 2005, Lynch had lost her custody battle and Ray went to live with his father. On December 28, she and Rutger were evicted from the house in Brentwood, and ended up homeless in Santa Monica, which has no resources for the homeless. The Police Department gave her no help and, she claims, laughed when she brought in evidence that she was being stalked by a known serial killer while she camped on the beach.

In 2006, Cohen was awarded a symbolic $9 million settlement in a civil suit against Lynch, who still does not have a lawyer representing her. Corporate books and other evidence of fraud appear to have been overlooked by Judge Ken Freeman in his judgment, Lynch says, although she admits she has not read the court documents and was never served a summons. At the time of the decision, she told reporters she lacked the money to make a phone call. That same year, her older son lost his fingers in an accident with a meat grinder while he was working at Whole Foods in Los Angeles and Lynch could not afford a bus ticket to visit him in hospital.

Lynch heard through a journalist that Cohen later testified for the District Attorney’s office in a secret grand jury relating to the Phil Spector case with former District Attorney Ira Reiner acting as his lawyer. Reiner is a personal friend of Cohen, and as D.A. presided over some high-profile cases including the “Night Stalker” serial killer and the McMartin Day Care scandal.

Recently, on June 17, 2008, Cohen’s lawsuit against the Agile Group was thrown out of court for lack of evidence. In response the AGILE Group dropped its counter-suit accusing Cohen of defamation and fraud. AGILE still claims to be shocked that a singer of Leonard Cohen’s talent and stature would engage in false accusations against his own representatives.

Lynch believes Cohen and AGILE colluded to defraud her. She continues to deny all allegations against her, and remains hopeful that Phil Spector’s lawyer, Bruce Cutler, will represent her in recouping damages to her livelihood and reputation. She now lives in another state and recently learned her younger son, 15, whom she has not seen since July 2005, stopped attending school last January.

NOTE: Lynch’s younger son did finish school.

These days Cohen’s fans seem to have expended their rage at Kelley Lynch for driving their idol into bankruptcy. Some now say she unwittingly did them a service — by forcing him to go on tour for the first time in nearly two decades.

At 74, singer-songwriter Leonard Cohen continues to ride a wave of sympathy, gathering wide support from the music world and even some British royalty. Unquestionably, his career and finances have benefited from news reports that he is too impoverished to retire.

From his tower of song, Cohen has written:

I smile when I’m angry
I cheat and I lie
I do what I have to do
To get by

And I’m always alone
And my heart is like ice
And it’s crowded and cold
In my secret life

My Secret Life. Leonard Cohen

His many admirers need to listen closely.

Lynch was never Cohen’s lover.



Criminal Harassment, Witness Tampering, Use of Fake Monikers, Etc.

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racketeeringact in Uncategorized May 11, 2016 51,662 Words
Criminal Harassment, Witness Tampering, Use of Fake Monikers, Etc. – May 2016

4

From: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2010@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, May 16, 2016 at 2:05 PM
Subject: The Criminal Stalker’s Ongoing Harassment
To: “*IRS.Commisioner” <*IRS.Commisioner@irs.gov>, Washington Field <washington.field@ic.fbi.gov>, ASKDOJ <ASKDOJ@usdoj.gov>, “Division, Criminal” <Criminal.Division@usdoj.gov>, “Doug.Davis” <Doug.Davis@ftb.ca.gov>, Dennis <Dennis@riordan-horgan.com>, MollyHale <MollyHale@ucia.gov>, fsb <fsb@fsb.ru>, rbyucaipa <rbyucaipa@yahoo.com>, khuvane <khuvane@caa.com>, blourd <blourd@caa.com>, Robert MacMillan <robert.macmillan@gmail.com>, a <anderson.cooper@cnn.com>, wennermedia <wennermedia@gmail.com>, Mick Brown <mick.brown@telegraph.co.uk>, “glenn.greenwald” <glenn.greenwald@firstlook.org>, Harriet Ryan <harriet.ryan@latimes.com>, “hailey.branson” <hailey.branson@latimes.com>, Stan Garnett <stan.garnett@gmail.com>, Mike Feuer <mike.feuer@lacity.org>, “mayor.garcetti” <mayor.garcetti@lacity.org>, Opla-pd-los-occ <OPLA-PD-LOS-OCC@ice.dhs.gov>, “Kelly.Sopko” <Kelly.Sopko@tigta.treas.gov>, Whistleblower <whistleblower@judiciary-rep.senate.gov>, Attacheottawa <AttacheOttawa@ci.irs.gov>, tips@radaronline.com, alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>, bruce <bruce@brucecutler.com>

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

I have privately forwarded you the most recent harassing emails I have received from Leonard Cohen’s co-conspirator, Stephen Gianelli. It is irrelevant if this pathological liar merely writes that he is not affiliated with Cohen/Kory/Rice as his actions speak otherwise. This man has relentlessly targeted me, my sons, sister, brother-in-law, elderly parents, Paulette Brandt, and witnesses who provided declarations for approximately seven straight years. Michelle Rice encouraged this individual to continue harassing me because it makes her “rich as fuck.” Kory urged Gianelli to bcc him on harassing emails. Gianelli continues to argue Leonard Cohen’s legal positions and defenses, has attempted to infiltrate matters (such as the IRS Chief Trial Counsel re. the Tax Court Petition), and is an agent provocateur who inserts extraneous information into the legal, business, corporate, and tax matters outstanding between me and Leonard Cohen. I will advise you that I still have not been provided with the IRS required tax and corporate information Cohen is required to provide me with regardless of the lies presented to the jurors throughout my 2012 trial.

I was not served Leonard Cohen’s lawsuit. Cohen and his lawyers, in response to my motion to vacate, fraudulently argued that I was the Jane Doe who was served and Cohen personally submitted photographs of me to the Court that were irrelevant and immaterial to the date of alleged subservice: August 24, 2005. I have submitted numerous declarations to the federal court proving that I did not resemble the Jane Doe who was alleged subserved, had no female co-occupant at the time of subservice, and there were numerous people present that morning who are all aware of the fact that I was not served. Furthermore, I diligently attempted to address Cohen’s failure to serve me with his legal representatives who refused to communicate with me and, in the alternative, filed and amended Cohen’s personal tax returns and used the fraudulent Complaint, and fabricated evidence, to apply for and receive fraudulent federal tax refunds. I moved diligently with respect to the motion to vacate. I discovered the Complaint online in April 2010, have no idea if that is an actual copy of the Complaint, and awareness of a lawsuit (including the misinformation re. the fraudulent default judgment advanced by the news media) is not service. I also should not be prejudiced due to the fact that Leonard Cohen and his co-defendants decided to willfully bankrupt me, withhold commissions due me, and steal from me re. default judgment. I didn’t read about anything while homeless from January through November 2006. That would include any attachments to emails transmitted to me. I was not in a position not in a position to open, download, print, or review legal documents during this period of time and to say otherwise is preposterous and absurd. After relocating to Los Angeles in June 2013, I moved diligently to set aside the fraudulently obtained judgment. Chad Knaak was asked to phone Edelman – to whom he did NOT speak so Edelman’s declaration is entirely hearsay – to advise him that I was not served, would hold him personally accountable, and inform Edelman that I viewed this lawsuit as an attempt to cover up potential criminal tax fraud.

In any event, Leonard Cohen’s lawyer, Stephen Gianelli, continues to argue Cohen’s legal positions. The bottom line is this: Leonard Cohen failed to serve me the lawsuit and believes he is entitled to steal by default judgment. He also appears to believe he is entitled to transfer the assets of suspended corporations to himself. Actually, every lawyer I have spoken with believes Hess should have invoked his inherent authority to vacate the fraudulently obtained judgment, believe I do have a remedy available, and continually refer to the overwhelming evidence – now submitted to the federal court – proving that Cohen’s complaint is nothing other than a concocted set of operative facts and the expense ledger is fabricated evidence that willfully disregards all corporate books and records.

The issues with respect to Cohen’s failure to serve me the summons and complaint do not resolve the fraud upon numerous U.S. District Courts or transmitted to Internal Revenue Service. And, it is overwhelmingly obvious that a valid default judgment does not present one with an opportunity to steal and convert the property of others or corporations to oneself out of a sense of entitlement and in an attempt to extricate oneself from what appears to be egregious tax fraud.

Kelley

The judgment is void.

_________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 9:33 PM
Subject: RE: Your email dated Sunday, May 15, 2016 11:58 PM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2010@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>
I know you don’t care for “rotten lawyer logic” but you really you really ought to consult with one about the odds of overturning the 2006 default judgment at this point (which are zero) because it is lawyerly analysis that is going to drive the outcome in any court proceeding, and not your selective reading of case authorities.

Sure, if all parties CONCEDE that no service was made, there is no jurisdiction over the defendant.

However THAT IS NOT YOUR SITUATION. The plaintiff’s claim you were served, as established by a written proof of service + affidavit of due diligence on file in BC338322 prior to entry of the default judgment. That document creates a PRESUMPTION of substitute service during a time period in which you concede you lived at that residence. It’s literally your word (and the word of your witnesses) against that of the process server.

Under your circumstances, it was your legal obligation to come forward and present any and all evidence that you were not served through a motion to vacate as soon as you learned your default had been entered. This was at some point BEFORE you started writing me in mid-2009, because you wrote to me in June of 2009 and said that Cohen’s judgment was “procured through fraud” because you were never served, and that you had “no intention to move to set it aside” because you considered it to be “evidence of tax fraud”. (You probably read about the judgment in the press sometime in 2006 or someone else did and told you, like everyone else who was aware of Leonard Cohen at the time.)

That was sufficient knowledge to require you to come forward with a motion to set the default aside RIGHT AWAY. The month you learned of the judgment.

Instead you waited until August of 2013 to file your motion to vacate, more than eight years from the date you had Chad call Edelman’s office about not trying to serve you again with the lawsuit or he would get sued, and more than seven years from entry of the default.

That created a factual conflict between the affidavit of service (and your email and telephone contacts with Edelman’s office on the day of service) and your declaration, that Judge Hess RESOLVED AGAINST YOU on January 17, 2014. Judge Hess also found that you failed to exercise due diligence in bringing the motion earlier. Both of these FACTUAL FINDINGS by Judge Hess on January 17, 2014 (absent a direct appeal) ended the matter.

The bottom line is that you ignore a default judgment of record (like the one in BC338322) at your peril.

You could have moved to set the judgment aside in April of 2010. You were in LA, staying at Rutger’s and had daily access to a paralegal office, equipped with computers and printers and you were working as a paralegal at the time. Indeed, you wrote me in early April, 2010 saying you were going to “move to vacate Cohen’s fraud judgment by the end of the week”. But you didn’t.

Instead you waited over three more years to do so.

That was fatal to your “due diligence” claim and in any event the court did not believe you were not served. Note that trial court credibility determinations generally may not be overturned by a court of appeal, as long as supported by some evidence and Judge Hess’ findings were supported by the proof of service and your contemporaneous phone calls and emails to plaintiff’s counsel on the same day that the process server claimed service occurred.

You can play out your pending “RICO suit” and your pending state court appeals, but the 2006 default judgment in BC338322 will never be set aside at this point.

Show any lawyer this email and ask him or her. If you ask 100 lawyers, 100 will tell you I am right.

This is not rocket science.

As always I write for myself alone and not on behalf of Kory Rice LLP (with which I have no affiliation) nor on behalf of any other person.

Enclosed cease and desist:

From: Kelley Lynch [mailto:kelley.lynch.2010@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, May 15, 2016 11:58 PM
To: *IRS.Commisioner; Washington Field; ASKDOJ; Division, Criminal; Doug.Davis; Dennis; MollyHale; fsb; rbyucaipa; khuvane; blourd; Robert MacMillan; a; wennermedia; Mick Brown; glenn.greenwald; Harriet Ryan; hailey.branson; Stan Garnett; Mike Feuer; mayor.garcetti; Opla-pd-los-occ; Kelly.Sopko; Whistleblower; Attacheottawa; tips@radaronline.com; alan hootnick; bruce; Stephen Gianelli; rkory; Michelle Rice
Subject: Re:

Cease and desist Gianelli, Kory & Rice

A party cannot be properly joined unless served with the summons and complaint;  notice does not substitute for proper service.   Until statutory requirements are satisfied, the court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant.  (Honda Motor Co. v. Superior  Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 861;  Schering Corp. v. Superior Ct. (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 737, 741, 125 Cal.Rptr. 337;  Stamps v. Superior Court (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 108, 110, 92 Cal.Rptr. 151;  In re Abrams (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 685, 693, 166 Cal.Rptr. 749.)   Without personal jurisdiction over Stacy, the judgment in the wrongful death action is ineffective as to her.  (Caldwell v. Coppola (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 859, 863, 268 Cal.Rptr. 453.) – See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1390136.html#sthash.z65OU2IQ.dpuf

________________________________________________________________

From: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2010@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 1:42 PM
Subject:
To: “*IRS.Commisioner” <*IRS.Commisioner@irs.gov>, Washington Field <washington.field@ic.fbi.gov>, ASKDOJ <ASKDOJ@usdoj.gov>, “Division, Criminal” <Criminal.Division@usdoj.gov>, “Doug.Davis” <Doug.Davis@ftb.ca.gov>, Dennis <Dennis@riordan-horgan.com>, MollyHale <MollyHale@ucia.gov>, fsb <fsb@fsb.ru>, rbyucaipa <rbyucaipa@yahoo.com>, khuvane <khuvane@caa.com>, blourd <blourd@caa.com>, Robert MacMillan <robert.macmillan@gmail.com>, a <anderson.cooper@cnn.com>, wennermedia <wennermedia@gmail.com>, Mick Brown <mick.brown@telegraph.co.uk>, “glenn.greenwald” <glenn.greenwald@firstlook.org>, Harriet Ryan <harriet.ryan@latimes.com>, “hailey.branson” <hailey.branson@latimes.com>, Stan Garnett <stan.garnett@gmail.com>, Mike Feuer <mike.feuer@lacity.org>, “mayor.garcetti” <mayor.garcetti@lacity.org>, Opla-pd-los-occ <OPLA-PD-LOS-OCC@ice.dhs.gov>, “Kelly.Sopko” <Kelly.Sopko@tigta.treas.gov>, Whistleblower <whistleblower@judiciary-rep.senate.gov>, Attacheottawa <AttacheOttawa@ci.irs.gov>, tips@radaronline.com, alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>, bruce <bruce@brucecutler.com>

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the part of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

A party cannot be properly joined unless served with the summons and complaint;  notice does not substitute for proper service.   Until statutory requirements are satisfied, the court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant.  (Honda Motor Co. v. Superior  Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 861;  Schering Corp. v. Superior Ct. (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 737, 741, 125 Cal.Rptr. 337;  Stamps v. Superior Court (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 108, 110, 92 Cal.Rptr. 151;  In re Abrams (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 685, 693, 166 Cal.Rptr. 749.)   Without personal jurisdiction over Stacy, the judgment in the wrongful death action is ineffective as to her.  (Caldwell v. Coppola (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 859, 863, 268 Cal.Rptr. 453.)

But in California, “the original service of process, which confers jurisdiction, must conform to statutory requirements or all that follows is void.”  (Honda Motor Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th, at p. 1048, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 861.)

See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1390136.html#sthash.z65OU2IQ.

That may be true in some jurisdictions, but California is a jurisdiction where the original service of process, which confers jurisdiction, must conform to statutory requirements or all that follows is void. (People v. Greene (1887) 74 Cal. 400, 405-406 [16 P. 197]; Schering Corp. v. Superior Court (1975) 52 Cal. App. 3d 737, 741 [125 Cal. Rptr. 337]; In re Abrams (1980) 108 Cal. App. 3d 685, 692-694 [166 Cal. Rptr. 749], and cases there cited; see Restatement of the Law, Judgments (1942) § 8, at p. 46 et seq.)

As the court noted, no California opinion had yet held that actual notice alone was enough to sustain service that did not comply with the statute.  (Id. at pp. 414, 415, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 338.)   To adopt such a regime would effect a “judicial repeal of California’s statutory law governing service of process.”   (Id. at p. 415, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 338.)   It would also generate increased litigation on service issues by “creat[ing] a standardless free-for-all.”   (Ibid.) –

See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1499969.html#sthash.kxPtjshm.dpuf

_________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

http://riverdeepbook.blogspot.com/2016/05/kelley-lynchs-state-bar-complaints.html

________________________________________________________________

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the art of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

______________________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the part of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

______________________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the part of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

______________________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the part of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

______________________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the part of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

______________________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the part of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

______________________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the part of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

______________________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the part of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

______________________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the part of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

______________________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the part of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

______________________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the part of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

______________________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the part of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

______________________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The logic on the part of Leonard Cohen’s proxy lawyer/co-conspirator has become increasingly rotten in these harassing emails. Most innocent people are not forced into bankruptcy by a man parading on the world stage as a religious sage after they offer the innocent party millions of dollars in settlement offers. A valid default judgment does not involve the theft of someone else’s property or extortion of millions of dollars. That is clearly not the purpose of a default judgment – to willfully and knowingly defraud another individual. Furthermore, I knew a lawsuit was filed against me on August 15, 2005 when the LA Times contacted me by email. On August 24, 2005, I asked Chad Knaak to phone Edelman’s office to inform him I was not served and would hold him accountable for his actions. Chad Knaak, and I was present, spoke to an assistant so Edelman’s declaration is absolute rubbish and hearsay. Knowledge of a lawsuit is not service. To this date, I have not been served. Nothing, including the evidence, suggests I am guilty. The evidence proves that Leonard Cohen embezzled in excess of $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC alone, withheld commissions due me, and then used the fraud default judgment to steal millions in IP from me and is now attempting to extort millions in fraudulent financial interest. The justice system does not require someone to seek service of a complaint. The justice system, in accordance with due process requirements, obliges the party who filed the suit to serve their adversary. That has not occurred to date. I’m not certain I follow why a passage of time would permit a fraudulently obtained default judgment, that is evidence of blatant theft and extortion, to become a valid judgment. One default judgment in California has been overturned. How unconscionable. However, look at the logic of this criminal who is nothing other than an ambulance chaser arguing and defending Leonard Cohen’s legal positions. Amazing conclusion – I would have won. I suppose that’s why Cohen and his army of professionals went out of their way to prevent me from participating in litigation. Hazel Atlas was quite clear that diligence is not an issue and in this case the situation is positively outrageous. One can indeed use RICO with respect to a fraudulently obtained judgment particularly when that judgment is part of the overall scheme to defraud and relates to the Tax Fraud Scheme, was used to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado District Court case, etc. The judgment is void. I was not served. If any judge concludes that this judgment is valid; I was served; or theft by default is acceptable – they are lying. No reasonable person on earth would conclude otherwise.

Gianelli has no idea what the State Bar previously told me apart from the documents I filed related to Cooley and Kory. One thing the State Bar told me is that Cooley had no jurisdiction over federal tax controversies. I suppose the City Attorney didn’t receive that memo. One can file a State Bar Complaint against an attorney who doesn’t represent them. That’s why the State Bar responded to my Complaint about Cooley. They didn’t tell me they couldn’t accept the Complaint. They told me people lie in their reports all the time and that’s not an issue for the State Bar. I found that rather shocking. No wonder the system works so beautifully for criminals.

Kelley

______________________________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:05 PM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

Ms. Lynch,

Most innocent people who become aware that they have been sued for millions on an embezzlement theory would have rushed to court to file at least a one page denial so their default is not taken, and then attended every hearing and the trial to make sure their story was heard BEFORE judgment was entered. The fact that you did not do so – despite getting actual notice of the time/place/dept. of the default hearing –and also the fact that you KNEW A SUIT WAS PENDING AS OF THE DAY YOU HAD CHAD PHONE EDELMAN’S OFFICE but did not investigate with the court, read the court file and take steps to protect your interests suggests you knew you were guilty.

But even if that is not true, we have a justice system that requires that once a person knows about a default to come into court quickly to set it aside. Not in a few years. Not in a few months, as soon as possible.

In my 37 years as a trial lawyer, defendants who wait over 90 days to move to set a default aside do not meet the due diligence test and are stuck with the judgment for life 90% of the time.

Those who wait over six months to move to set the judgment aside are stuck with it 999 times out of a 1,000.

There is only ONE KNOWN CASE in California when a defendant successfully set aside a judgment after a delay of years and that guy WAS IN PRISON on the day of service at his alleged house (and for months before that for years after) so THERE WAS NO DOUBT the proof of service was false.

You had no chance by 2013 to move to set the judgment aside. None at all. The fact that you thought you did is quaint, even a little ridiculous, but you had no chance at all. Same thing with your 2015 motion to vacate/dismiss.

For different legal reasons, but based on some of the same policy considerations, your 2016 federal court suit seeking to overturn the 2006 judgment cannot succeed. There is not even a million to one chance it will succeed. Zero. Will not happen. You could file a hundred legal proceedings at this point and it would not change a thing.

That has zero to do at this point on whether – had you filed an answer and attended the trial or even filed a cross-complaint with your current 13 “claims for relief” – you would have won.

You did not address the suit in a timely manner, your excuses do not matter, and those are the rules.

You may not like the rules, but those are still the rules.

You cannot use a RICO (or any) federal court suit 10 years after entry of a state-court default judgment to do what the state court refused to do in 2013 and in 2015 –set it aside.

Your affirmative claims are also barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Whenever that period started running, ten years later leaves no doubt.

Accept it or don’t.

But all of these judges are not “lying”. They are simply applying the rules that everyone must follow – even you. And what Leonard Cohen (or anyone) “thinks” at this point just doesn’t matter one bit.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:48 PM
Subject: kelley Lynch email dated Sun, May 15, 2016 at 10:46 AM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Didn’t you file all those complaints before?

How did that work out for you?

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 12:55 PM
Subject: Bar complaints
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

PS: The reason the Bar wants to know about the fee agreement, payment etc. is that they generally only investigate complaints against YOUR lawyer – not someone else’s lawyer (or in my case no one’s lawyer), UNLESS based on a referral by a judge or following a judicial finding of misconduct. Also, the State Bar only regulates attorney conduct while they are practicing law for a client, not private activity, unless the lawyer is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

But the State Bar told you all of this before.

From: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 8:22 AM
Subject: Fwd: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: “*irs. commissioner” <*IRS.Commissioner@irs.gov>, Washington Field <washington.field@ic.fbi.gov>, ASKDOJ <ASKDOJ@usdoj.gov>, “: Division, Criminal” <Criminal.Division@usdoj.gov>, “Doug.Davis” <Doug.Davis@ftb.ca.gov>, Dennis <Dennis@riordan-horgan.com>, MollyHale <MollyHale@ucia.gov>, fsb <fsb@fsb.ru>, rbyucaipa <rbyucaipa@yahoo.com>, khuvane <khuvane@caa.com>, blourd <blourd@caa.com>, Robert MacMillan <robert.macmillan@gmail.com>, a <anderson.cooper@cnn.com>, wennermedia <wennermedia@gmail.com>, Mick Brown <mick.brown@telegraph.co.uk>, “glenn.greenwald” <glenn.greenwald@firstlook.org>, Harriet Ryan <harriet.ryan@latimes.com>, “hailey.branson” <hailey.branson@latimes.com>, Stan Garnett <stan.garnett@gmail.com>, Mike Feuer <mike.feuer@lacity.org>, “mayor.garcetti” <mayor.garcetti@lacity.org>, Opla-pd-los-occ <OPLA-PD-LOS-OCC@ice.dhs.gov>, “Kelly.Sopko” <Kelly.Sopko@tigta.treas.gov>, Whistleblower <whistleblower@judiciary-rep.senate.gov>, Attacheottawa <AttacheOttawa@ci.irs.gov>, tips@radaronline.com, alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>, bruce <bruce@brucecutler.com>

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

My criminal stalker, the co-conspirator Gianelli, has decided to copy Alan Hootnick on this particular harassing email. I have been clear about this issue: anyone who says I was served Cohen’s complaint is lying. I advised Judge Hess that I do not appreciate being called a liar and neither do my witnesses who submitted declarations. The judge during my 2012 trial sentenced me for domestic violence when there isn’t any. There’s a fraudulent registration of a Colorado order issued without findings. When do these courts take responsibility for their own actions? I found the decision re. my motion to vacate the DMV order bizarre? I’m supposed to litigate the issues in hindsight when I was unaware of them. Who could follow that logic?

Leonard Cohen is the individual who has embezzled money. He has embezzled over $7 million from Traditional Holdings, LLC. He and his wholly owned LLC have embezzled millions of dollars that belongs to Blue Mist Touring. Cohen has now transferred assets of suspended corporations to himself while the corporations were suspended although that’s illegal. He has stolen from me by default judgment. The King Drew file is evidence of fraud not a psychiatric record. I’ve submitted that to IRS, FBI, and DOJ and asked for an investigation. I didn’t forge any declarations and submitted the declarations to the federal court with the signature pages. Gianelli stalks, harasses, intimidates, and threatens witnesses. That’s part of his job. He has also spent seven straight years terrorizing my sons. He has attempted to infiltrate matters – including with IRS Chief Trial Counsel’s Office – and continues to argue Leonard Cohen’s legal positions.

Kelley

Original signature pages were submitted to the federal court and were not forged.

Exhibit QQ: Declarations

———- Forwarded message ———-
From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>

Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 8:00 AM
Subject: RE: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

What are you going to say about my legal analysis when the district court dismisses with prejudice for the same reasons I have spelled out? Will the dismissal by a former RICO prosecutor who has been on the district court bench for 32 YEARS be considered by you to be “absurd” as well? Or are you going to say that the district court “lied” in its order, like you accused the judge who signed the 2006 default of lying, your 2012 sentencing judge of lying, accused Judge Hess of lying, and accused the judge who denied your motion to vacate the 2011 registration of the protection order of “lying”?

Me and 9 judges who have no connection to each other are “lying” but Kelley Lynch, the accused embezzler with the criminal and psychiatric record who signs witnesses declarations for the witnesses has it right? Please, not even you could accept that statement as remotely plausible.

From: Kelley Lynch [mailto:kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, May 15, 2016 3:59 PM
To: Stephen Gianelli; *irs. commissioner; Washington Field; ASKDOJ; : Division, Criminal; Dennis; bruce
Subject: Fwd: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud

Gianelli

Cease and desist. I am aware that the criminal believes he is entitled to steal, commit tax fraud, extort monies, etc. I know him well. The situation is far, far from over regardless of your absurd legal analysis.

Kelley Lynch

———- Forwarded message ———-
From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 4:02 AM
Subject: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

See yellow highlighting.

749 F.3d 1180 (2014)

Judy KNIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, and
PHOENIX CENTRAL, INC.; Mini Malls of America; John Doe, unknown investors in Mooring #1 thru xx; Jane Doe, unknown investors in Mooring #1 thru xx, Plaintiffs,
v.
MOORING CAPITAL FUND, LLC; Mooring Financial Corporation; John Jacquemin, Defendants-Appellees, and
David Nalls; John Doe; Jane Doe; Counsels and Agents of Defendants, Defendants.

No. 13-6112.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

April 22, 2014.

1182*1182 Submitted on the briefs:[*]

Judy Knight, filed a brief pro se.

Leif E. Swedlow, Andrews Davis, P.C., Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before HARTZ, McKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Judy Knight appeals from the dismissal of her lawsuit on the grounds of untimeliness, failure to state a claim, and claim preclusion (res judicata). We affirm the judgment below. Most of our reasons for affirmance are routine. But this appeal does raise interesting questions regarding claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, based on alleged misconduct in prior litigation.

Background

In 2010 this court decided two appeals involving claims and cross-claims between, on one side, Ms. Knight and her company Phoenix Central Inc. (Phoenix), an Oklahoma corporation, and, on the other side, Mooring Capital Fund, LLC (Capital) and Mooring Financial Corporation (Financial). See Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Knight, 388 Fed.Appx. 814 (10th Cir.2010) (Mooring I). Two years later, Ms. Knight filed a new suit in Oklahoma state court on behalf of herself, Phoenix, and another of 1183*1183 her companies, Mini Malls of America, also an Oklahoma corporation. The defendants were Capital and Financial and individuals associated with them, including Financial’s Chief Executive Officer, John Jacquemin, and unnamed “Counsels and Agents of Defendants.” R. at 15. Capital, Financial, and Mr. Jacquemin removed the litigation to federal district court.

The removing defendants moved to dismiss with prejudice. In addition to filing a response, Ms. Knight filed a first amended complaint that named as additional defendants the law firm and individual lawyers who represented Capital and Financial in Mooring I (the Counsel Defendants). Capital, Financial, and Mr. Jacquemin then moved to dismiss the first amended complaint with prejudice. Citing claim preclusion, the statute of limitations, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court granted the motion the next day. In the same order, the court sua sponte dismissed the claims against the other defendants.

The day after the district court filed its judgment dismissing the action with prejudice, Ms. Knight filed a motion to remand the case to state court, which the district court denied as moot. Ms. Knight then filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 motion to vacate, alter, or amend the dismissal order, which the district court also denied. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Knight sent an e-mail message seeking the district judge’s recusal. The court ordered the e-mail to be filed and denied the request for recusal. Ms. Knight has appealed.[1] We affirm. The removal of the case to federal court was proper. Some of Ms. Knight’s claims were untimely and the others fail to state a claim or are barred by issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). And her request for recusal was untimely.

Analysis
Issues Concerning Removal
District Court’s Jurisdiction

We first consider Ms. Knight’s challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction, reviewing the issue de novo, see Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir.2006). The district court may exercise removal jurisdiction over “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In removing the action, defendants primarily relied upon diversity jurisdiction, but they also cited federal-question jurisdiction. We need not consider the arguments regarding diversity jurisdiction because Ms. Knight’s assertion of federal-law claims under RICO supports federal-question jurisdiction. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). On appeal Ms. Knight appears to argue that she did not assert any federal-law claims. That argument is undermined, however, by the plain text of both her original and first amended complaints.

Counsel Defendants’ Consent to Removal

The case was removed to federal court by Capital, Financial, and Mr. Jacquemin. Ms. Knight argues that removal was improper because the Counsel Defendants did not join in or consent to the removal, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). But consent is required 1184*1184 only of “defendants who have been properly joined and served,” id., and Ms. Knight, although asserting that she mailed a summons and complaint to the Counsel Defendants, has failed to demonstrate that they had been properly served at the time of removal.

Because the action was in Oklahoma state court before removal, we examine Oklahoma’s service requirements. Oklahoma allows service by mail on individuals and entities. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2)(a). It is not clear, however, that Oklahoma would allow a pro se party to mail service. Section 2004(C)(2)(a) implies the contrary by specifying that service by mail can be accomplished “by the plaintiff’s attorney, any person authorized to serve process pursuant to subparagraph a of paragraph 1 of this section [listing sheriff or deputy sheriff, licensed process server, or person specially appointed to serve process], or by the court clerk.”

But even assuming that pro se plaintiffs can accomplish service by mail under Oklahoma law, the record in this case contains no evidence that service was so accomplished, much less that it was accomplished before the filing of the notice of removal. For service by mail in Oklahoma, one must “mail[] a copy of the summons and petition by certified mail, return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee.” Id. § 2004(C)(2)(b). “Service by mail shall be effective on the date of receipt or if refused, on the date of refusal of the summons and petition by the defendant.” Id. § 2004(C)(2)(a). Although Ms. Knight states that she mailed a summons and complaint via registered mail, return receipt requested, to one lawyer and the law firm, her unsupported assertions are insufficient to show that she complied with the relevant service requirements. The record does not contain any return receipts showing the date of delivery or any other evidence that the documents actually were properly addressed, were deposited in the mail, and were delivered or refused. See Chester v. Green, 120 F.3d 1091, 1091 (10th Cir.1997) (plaintiff failed to show service because there was “no authenticating post office stamp on any receipt showing they actually passed through the mails, nor [was] there a receipt or acknowledgment showing actual delivery of the complaint to the purported defendants”); Colclazier & Assocs. v. Stephens, 277 P.3d 1285, 1290 (Okla.Civ.App.2012) (“[A]bsent any documentary evidence supporting the Law Firm’s claim of attempted mailings, the district court could not have determined that service by mail had been made.”). Since Ms. Knight has failed to establish that the Counsel Defendants were served before the date of removal, their consent to removal was not required.

Dismissal of Claims

Ms. Knight challenges the district court’s application of statutes of limitations, Rule 12(b)(6), and claim preclusion. For ease of analysis, we divide her claims into two categories — first, claims concerning events that occurred before the Mooring I litigation (Phase 1 claims), and, second, claims concerning events that occurred during the Mooring I proceedings (Phase 2 claims). We address each category separately. Our review is de novo. See Wallace v. Microsoft Corp., 596 F.3d 703, 705 (10th Cir.2010) (statute of limitations); Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir.2010) (Rule 12(b)(6)); Valley View Angus Ranch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Field Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th Cir.2007) (preclusion).

Phase 1 Claims

The Phase 1 claims are claims based on events before Mooring I. They include claims that were asserted but failed in 1185*1185 Mooring I and claims that could have been asserted but were not. It was proper for the district court to dismiss these claims on the ground that any applicable limitations period had expired.

The Phase 1 claims predate Mooring I, which began in state court in September 2005 and was removed to federal court in January 2006. The present action was not filed until July 2012. By then, any Phase 1 claims clearly were untimely. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 95(A)(1) (five-year limitations period for actions upon written contracts, agreements, and promises); id. § 95(A)(2) (three-year limitations period for oral contracts and liabilities created by statute); id. § 95(A)(3) (two-year limitations period for torts and fraud); Dummar v. Lummis, 543 F.3d 614, 621 (10th Cir. 2008) (four-year limitations period for federal RICO claims); Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1409(E) (five-year limitations period for Oklahoma RICO claims).

Phase 2 Claims

The Phase 2 claims are those claims concerning events that occurred during Mooring I. They include claims that the defendants committed fraud and deceit in their filings and testimony and that their litigation conduct was tortious. It was proper for the district court to dismiss the Phase 2 claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and on the ground of preclusion (although the appropriate preclusion doctrine is issue preclusion, not claim preclusion).

Claims Under Oklahoma Law

The majority of the Phase 2 claims are claims under Oklahoma law. Oklahoma, however, has afforded participants in judicial proceedings an absolute immunity against later civil suits grounded in litigation conduct. See Patel v. OMH Med. Ctr., Inc., 987 P.2d 1185, 1202 (Okla. 1999) (“To the extent [plaintiff’s] petition relies on perjurious testimony as the basis of her claim for damages, whether denominated perjury, fraud, deceit, or `prima facie tort’, the petition fails to state a claim.”); id. at 1202-03 (remedies for litigation-related misconduct must be pursued in the litigated case, or by criminal or bar-discipline proceedings); Cooper v. Parker-Hughey, 894 P.2d 1096, 1098-1101 (Okla. 1995) (absolute immunity for witness testimony; no civil cause of action for perjury); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 945, 954 (Okla.1990) (barring claim of defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress against attorneys, parties, or witnesses founded on communications made in preparation for contemplated judicial proceeding); Hartley v. Williamson, 18 P.3d 355, 358 (Okla.Civ.App.2000) (barring claims for negligence, deceit, and conspiracy founded on testimony at judicial proceeding); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-35, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (immunity of parties and witnesses); Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1570-71 (10th Cir.1991) (Briscoe immunity extends to alleged conspiracies to commit perjury).

Further, Ms. Knight cannot bring suit under the Oklahoma RICO statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1401-1419. That statute restricts standing to bring “any proceedings, civil or criminal” to “the Attorney General, any district attorney or any [specially appointed] district attorney.” Id. § 1404(C); see also id. § 1409(A) (“The Attorney General, any district attorney or any [special] district attorney … may institute civil proceedings….”); id. § 1419 (construction of Oklahoma RICO may follow construction of federal RICO, “provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to provide for any private right of action or confer any civil remedy except as specifically set out in this act”).

Accordingly, the Oklahoma-law Phase 2 claims failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

1186*1186 b. RICO Claims

The remaining Phase 2 claims are the federal RICO claims. For these claims, Ms. Knight asserts that defendants made misrepresentations to the district court, through pleadings and testimony, that increased the cost of litigating Mooring I and caused the district court to rule against her on her individual claims in Mooring I. She alleges that this activity violated the federal wire-fraud and mail-fraud statutes, and thereby constituted a pattern of racketeering in violation of RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). In light of the Mooring I judgment, however, she is barred from bringing these claims.

An essential element of a RICO claim is that the plaintiff was injured in her business or property by the RICO violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (creating a civil cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962”); Deck v. Engineered Laminates, 349 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir.2003) (“[A] plaintiff has standing to bring a RICO claim only if he was injured in his business or property by reason of the defendant’s violation of § 1962.”). But, as explained below, the damages Ms. Knight alleges from Phase 2 conduct — increased litigation costs and lost claims — were matters resolved by Mooring I. Further litigation of these issues is therefore precluded, and the Phase 2 RICO claims cannot proceed unless and until Ms. Knight obtains relief from the judgment in Mooring I. See Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 56 F.3d 1268, 1272-73 (10th Cir.1995) (plaintiffs could not pursue fraud claims based on litigation misconduct without first obtaining relief from prior judgment because their claims of damages from fraud were incompatible with facts necessarily decided in the prior action).

Because Mooring I is a federal judgment in a diversity action applying Oklahoma law, Oklahoma’s preclusion law applies. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508, 121 S.Ct. 1021, 149 L.Ed.2d 32 (2001). In this case the appropriate preclusion doctrine is issue preclusion. We recognize that the district court relied on claim preclusion rather than issue preclusion, but we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 760 (10th Cir.2010). And the defendants raised both claim preclusion and issue preclusion in the district court, so Ms. Knight had an opportunity to address both doctrines. See id.

“Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of facts and issues actually litigated and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or their privies.” Durham v. McDonald’s Rests. Of Okla., Inc., 256 P.3d 64, 66 (Okla. 2011) (emphasis omitted).

To establish issue preclusion, a party must prove: 1) that the party against whom it is being asserted was either a party to or a privy of a party to the prior action; 2) that the issue subject to preclusion has actually been adjudicated in the prior case; 3) that the adjudicated issue was necessary and essential to the outcome of that prior case; and 4) the party against whom it is interposed had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or critical issue.

Id. at 66-67 (emphasis omitted). “The principle of issue preclusion operates to bar from relitigation both correct and erroneous resolutions of jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional challenges.” Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. McCrady, 176 P.3d 1194, 1199 (Okla.2007). “An issue is actually litigated and necessarily determined if it is properly raised in the pleadings, or otherwise submitted for determination, and judgment would not have been rendered 1187*1187 but for the determination of that issue.” Id.

Before examining the applicability of issue preclusion to the two types of damage alleged by Ms. Knight — increased litigation costs in Mooring I and her loss on the merits in Mooring I — we address three potential grounds for not applying preclusion doctrine to her federal RICO claims. First, Ms. Knight asserts that the defendants other than Capital and Financial (namely, the individual defendants and the law firm) cannot rely on preclusion because they were not parties in Mooring I. Those other defendants, however, are in privity with Capital and Financial. See Plotner v. AT & T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th Cir.2000) (“The law firm defendants appear by virtue of their activities as representatives of [other defendants], also creating privity.”); Fox v. Maulding, 112 F.3d 453, 459-60 (10th Cir.1997) (officers and directors of bank were privies of bank for purposes of RICO claims because allegations related to actions taken in their capacities as officers and directors). “In light of the circumstances of this case, including the alleged relationship between the defendants in this and the previous trial, we think that Oklahoma would not prohibit the defensive assertion of collateral estoppel on the sole grounds that the defendants here were not parties to the previous action.” Robinson, 56 F.3d at 1272 n. 3.

Second, Ms. Knight complains that the defendants did not submit the entire record from Mooring I in support of their preclusion argument. The district court, however, could take judicial notice of its own records to evaluate preclusion. See Gee, 627 F.3d at 1194.

Third, we consider the possibility that issue preclusion does not apply here because Ms. Knight’s complaint enables her to set aside the judgment in Mooring I, eliminating any preclusive effect that it may have. We reject the possibility for the following reasons.

To begin with, the remedies under RICO do not include setting aside a prior judgment or undermining its preclusive effect by a collateral attack. The circuits to consider the matter have rejected such relief. See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-LWood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir.1988) (“RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.”); see also Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50 (5th Cir.2008) (RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award); Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, 387 F.3d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir.2004) (RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world).

Moreover, Ms. Knight’s complaint does not support a direct attack on the Mooring I judgment under either Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) (court may relieve a party of a judgment for “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party”) or an action based on fraud on the court, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(d)(3) (Rule 60 “does not limit a court’s power to … set aside a judgment for fraud on the court”). If construed as a motion under Rule 60(b)(3) (which would need to have been filed in Mooring I in any event), the motion was untimely under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1) (one-year time limit for Rule 60(b)(3) motions). And the complaint’s allegations regarding defendants’ litigation misconduct fail to rise to the level of a claim for fraud on the court. See Plotner, 224 F.3d at 1170 (fraud on the court “refers to misrepresentation direct[ly] affecting 1188*1188 the judicial process, not simply the non-disclosure to one party of facts known by another”); Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 553 (10th Cir.1996) (allegations of “material misrepresentations or omitted information needed to make … answers fully truthful … simply do not rise to the level necessary to constitute `fraud on the court’”); Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir.1985) (en banc) (“Fraud on the court … is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury…. It is thus fraud where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function — thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted.”).

We now examine the elements of issue preclusion with respect to Ms. Knight’s two categories of alleged damages.

Increased Costs in Mooring I

As one item of damages, Ms. Knight asserts that defendants’ fraud unnecessarily increased the costs of litigating Mooring I. But the parties’ conduct, and its relation to the fees and costs incurred, were issues in Mooring I.

After the trial, both sides moved for awards of attorney fees. Phoenix requested an award of $224,392.17 against Capital and Financial, and Capital and Financial requested an award of $306,644.34 against Ms. Knight. See Mooring I, 388 Fed. Appx. at 818. The district court granted the motions in part, awarding Phoenix $49,000 and awarding Capital and Financial $88,000. Id. As part of its determination, “the district court declined to find that Capital and Financial acted in bad faith [and] assessed blame for the protracted litigation on all parties, not just Capital and Financial.” Id. at 828; see also id. at 826 (district court “observed that both parties’ fees were unreasonable [and] that both parties contributed to the excessive fees”). Phoenix appealed the amount of the fees awarded to it, and Ms. Knight appealed the award in favor of Capital and Financial against her. See id. at 818, 825-28.

On appeal Ms. Knight argued “that Capital and Financial do not deserve an award of fees because of their bad faith and misconduct” and that the district court “did not properly weigh that Capital and Financial created the situation that led to increased fees.” Id. at 827. This court held, however, that the district court “thoughtfully reviewed the case, taking into account” the proper factors in determining a fee award. Id. Further, this court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find that Capital and Financial acted in bad faith and in assessing blame for increased costs on all the parties. See id. at 828.

All the elements of issue preclusion are met as to Ms. Knight’s claim of RICO damages from the increased costs of litigating Mooring I. Ms. Knight, individually, was a party in Mooring I. As discussed above, the district court actually adjudicated the parties’ responsibility for the fees and costs incurred in litigating the action. The district court considered Ms. Knight’s allegations of misconduct, but it specifically declined to find that Capital and Financial acted in bad faith. If they did not act in bad faith, they could not have acted fraudulently; therefore, Ms. Knight’s current claim of damage would require her to establish facts that are incompatible with Mooring I. Further, the adjudication was necessary and essential to the court’s determination of the parties’ motions for fees and costs.

As to the final element of issue preclusion, Ms. Knight argues that because of 1189*1189 defendants’ fraudulent conduct, she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims in Mooring I. We disagree. In large part, “full and fair opportunity” focuses on procedural due process and fundamental fairness. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated:

Issue preclusion … is an equitable doctrine. Where the parties’ alignment and the raised legal and factual issues warrant and fairness to the parties is not compromised by the process, its application is appropriate. It is indeed the proceeding’s substance and the degree of due process inherent in it, rather than its form, which is the court’s bellwether for the doctrine’s application.

Cities Serv. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 980 P.2d 116, 126 (Okla.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). And in a case arising from Oklahoma, this court wrote, “The requirement that the party against whom the prior judgment is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to be heard centers on the fundamental fairness of preventing the party from relitigating an issue he has lost in a prior proceeding.” Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1521 (10th Cir.1990).

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has identified several relevant factors in evaluating this element:

(1) whether the [party] had ample incentive to litigate the issue fully in the earlier proceeding; (2) whether the judgment or order for which preclusive effect is sought is itself inconsistent with one or more earlier judgments in the [party’s] favor; … (3) whether the second action affords the [party] procedural opportunities unavailable in the first that could readily produce a different result; … [(4)] whether the current litigation’s legal demands are closely aligned in time and subject matter to those in the earlier proceedings; [(5)] whether the present litigation was clearly foreseeable … at the time of the earlier proceedings; and [(6)] whether in the first proceeding the [party] had sufficient opportunity to be heard on the issue.

Cities Serv. Co., 980 P.2d at 125 (footnotes omitted); see also Sil-Flo, 917 F.2d at 1521 (“Often, the inquiry will focus on whether there were significant procedural limitations in the prior proceeding, whether the party had the incentive to litigate fully the issue, or whether effective litigation was limited by the nature or relationship of the parties.”); Restatement (2d) of Judgments §§ 28, 29 (listing factors that may justify not applying preclusion).[2]

Nothing in this appeal indicates that applying issue preclusion would be fundamentally unfair to Ms. Knight. She had the opportunity to be heard in Mooring I, including the opportunity to appeal to this court, and she had ample incentive to litigate the issue fully, given that Capital and Financial sought an award exceeding $300,000. We recognize that preclusion may not be appropriate when “the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action.” Restatement (2d) of Judgments § 28(5)(c). But Ms. Knight does not identify any arguments she would have made regarding fees and costs in Mooring I had it not been for defendants’ alleged fraud, does not offer any specific explanation of how defendants’ litigation misconduct affected her ability to litigate the issue of fees and costs in Mooring I, and does not allege 1190*1190 that there is evidence of litigation misconduct that was unavailable while Mooring I was pending.

Lost Claims in Mooring I

As another item of damages, Ms. Knight asserts that the defendants’ conduct caused the district court to rule against her on her individual claims in Mooring I. This court has recognized that a cause of action is a form of property for purposes of RICO. See Deck, 349 F.3d at 1259. But we decline to recognize a conclusively meritless claim as property under RICO, and Ms. Knight’s individual claims in Mooring I were declared to be meritless. See 388 Fed.Appx. at 818, 823-25. As with her litigation-costs argument, unless and until the Mooring I judgment is vacated, issue preclusion establishes conclusively that her claims in Mooring I lacked merit.

Each element of issue preclusion is satisfied with regard to Ms. Knight’s individual claims. She presented her individual claims to the court, and judgment was rendered against her. Id. at 818, 827. The adjudication of her claims was necessary and essential to the outcome of Mooring I. And Ms. Knight alleges no facts indicating that she lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate her individual claims in Mooring I. Rather than offering any specific explanation of how defendants’ litigation misconduct prevented her from adequately presenting her individual claims, she makes only conclusory allegations that defendants’ misconduct caused the court to rule against her unjustly.

As long as the Mooring I judgment stands, Ms. Knight cannot plead an essential element of her Phase 2 RICO claim — namely, injury to a colorable cause of action. Dismissal of the claim is required under the doctrine of issue preclusion.

Remaining Arguments

Ms. Knight asserts that the dismissal decision was premature because the district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss before her deadline to file a motion to remand to state court and before her response period expired. She also complains that the district court granted judgment for some defendants sua sponte, it did not give her the opportunity to amend, and it dismissed her claims with prejudice. We see no reversible error. First, Ms. Knight was not prejudiced by the court’s taking action before she could move to remand, because such a motion would have failed. Second, although we disfavor (1) sua sponte dismissals and (2) dismissals before the losing party has an opportunity to respond, this court has held that such a “dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is not reversible error when it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged and allowing [her] an opportunity to amend [her] complaint would be futile.” McKinney v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir.1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, even though pro se parties generally should be given leave to amend, it is appropriate to dismiss without allowing amendment “where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts [s]he has alleged and it would be futile to give [her] an opportunity to amend.” Gee, 627 F.3d at 1195 (internal quotation marks omitted). And finally, “[a] dismissal with prejudice is appropriate where a complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and granting leave to amend would be futile,” Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.2006); see also Gee, 627 F.3d at 1181, 1195 (affirming dismissal with prejudice of claims barred by statute of limitations and claim preclusion). For the reasons discussed, it is patently obvious that Ms. Knight cannot proceed with her claims, 1191*1191 and any further opportunity to amend would be futile because her claims would still be barred. Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing claims sua sponte, in dismissing without affording Ms. Knight an opportunity to amend, or in dismissing the claims with prejudice.

Finally, Ms. Knight asserts that the district judge should have recused himself. But she did not request recusal until after the district court dismissed her action and denied her Rule 59 motion. That was too late. “We have held that under either 28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455, the party seeking recusal must act in a timely fashion to request recusal.” United States v. Stenzel, 49 F.3d 658, 661 (10th Cir.1995).

Rule 59 Motion

We review the denial of a Rule 59 motion for abuse of discretion. See Price v. Wolford, 608 F.3d 698, 706 (10th Cir.2010). Because we have found no reversible error, we also find no abuse of discretion in denying the Rule 59 motion.

III. Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

[*] After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

[1] Ms. Knight filed notices of appeal naming as appellants herself and her two corporations. We have previously explained to Ms. Knight that as a nonattorney she cannot represent a corporation in federal court. See Mooring I, 388 Fed.Appx. at 823. No counsel has filed a notice of appeal or appeared for the entities. Consequently, Ms. Knight is the only appellant, and we do not consider any arguments regarding the entities’ claims.

[2] The Oklahoma Supreme Court has relied on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as authority. See, e.g., Johnson v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2 P.3d 334, 337 (Okla.2000); Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp., 920 P.2d 122, 132 (Okla.1996).

______________________________________________________________

From: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 8:11 AM
Subject: Fwd: EVERY FEDERAL CIRCUIT TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE HAS HELD THAT THE RICO STATUTE MAY NOT BE USED TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK OR TO OVERTURN A STATE-COURT JUDGMENT
To: “*irs. commissioner” <*IRS.Commissioner@irs.gov>, Washington Field <washington.field@ic.fbi.gov>, ASKDOJ <ASKDOJ@usdoj.gov>, “Doug.Davis” <Doug.Davis@ftb.ca.gov>, Dennis <Dennis@riordan-horgan.com>, MollyHale <MollyHale@ucia.gov>, fsb <fsb@fsb.ru>, rbyucaipa <rbyucaipa@yahoo.com>, khuvane <khuvane@caa.com>, blourd <blourd@caa.com>, Robert MacMillan <robert.macmillan@gmail.com>, a <anderson.cooper@cnn.com>, wennermedia <wennermedia@gmail.com>, Mick Brown <mick.brown@telegraph.co.uk>, “glenn.greenwald” <glenn.greenwald@firstlook.org>, Harriet Ryan <harriet.ryan@latimes.com>, “hailey.branson” <hailey.branson@latimes.com>, Stan Garnett <stan.garnett@gmail.com>, Mike Feuer <mike.feuer@lacity.org>, “mayor.garcetti” <mayor.garcetti@lacity.org>, Opla-pd-los-occ <OPLA-PD-LOS-OCC@ice.dhs.gov>, “Kelly.Sopko” <Kelly.Sopko@tigta.treas.gov>, Whistleblower <whistleblower@judiciary-rep.senate.gov>, Attacheottawa <AttacheOttawa@ci.irs.gov>, tips@radaronline.com, alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>, bruce <bruce@brucecutler.com>

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

Cohen’s co-conspirator/proxy lawyer continues on with his harassment over my RICO suit. I avoid what point? The point that this criminal continues to harass and stalk me? I think not. Donziger’s brief is not a court decision and Gianelli should argue this with the court. Every court to consider the issue (THREE) has decided that a fraud judgment should be viewed as valid by a federal court? Why?

There is no lack of racketeering. The criminal conduct related to this fraud default judgment is outrageous and that includes with respect to IRS. I’ll address with the Senate Finance Committee because I find the situation with respect to the fraud tax refunds outrageous. My “conspiracy” allegations are plausible because they are factual. There is most definitely a criminal enterprise and the conduct is obviously ongoing. Transmission of fraudulent documents and evidence to the federal court via Pacer is wire fraud. I don’t see an exclusion for federal courts in the wire fraud statutes.

I see Gianelli is now attempting to speak directly to Judge Wilson but referring to him as the “Honorable Judge V. Wilson.” Is it Judge Wilson’s custom to write his own orders? When can Judge Wilson validate a fraudulent state court judgment that was issued without serving me? I still have not been served and have no idea if the complaint or document thrown online by this criminal is the actual complaint. When precisely is that service? The judgment is void. Hazel Atlas also applies. One thing is very clear here: the courts have gangs of out of control lawyers willing to do and say anything for their clients so why aren’t their documents reviewed for fraud and perjury before being formally considered filed?

Judge Wilson was a former Assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted organized crime. Great. Maybe he can answer my question: how long of a prison sentence would John Gotti be serving if he was Leonard Cohen? Stephen Gianelli is complimenting Judge Wilson. He must view him as a man who can be manipulated. I’ve seen this go on with all of Cohen’s lawyers and judges. They blatantly lie to them while sucking up. It’s absurd.

It’s factual. I have filed a necessarily lengthy document and explained the reasons for doing so to the court. I should not be prejudiced because Leonard Cohen’s conduct spans quite a period of time and involves a complex conspiracy that has a related Tax Fraud Scheme. The evidence is necessary or the judge would have to guess about the plausibility of the fraud upon the court, etc.

I discovered the scheme to defraud me in April 2012 when I was wrongfully arrested. See LAPD’s report. I was arrested over emails generally requesting tax information. I have no idea why the IRS Binder was submitted as evidence. I know one thing: the fraud state court judgment has been used to interfere with federal tax matters and so have the fraud restraining orders.

Let me ask you this question: when can the federal court validate a fraudulently obtained state court judgment in a matter where I was not served?

The bottom line: this situation is far from over regardless of the ongoing criminal harassment, stalking, threats, etc.

Kelley

———- Forwarded message ———-
From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>

Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 7:54 AM
Subject: RE: EVERY FEDERAL CIRCUIT TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE HAS HELD THAT THE RICO STATUTE MAY NOT BE USED TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK OR TO OVERTURN A STATE-COURT JUDGMENT
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

You studiously avoid the point: Regardless of how Donziger will fare on appeal in his case wherein the district court allowed the collateral attack of a FOREIGN JUDGMENT, every district court to consider the issue (three total) held that the RICO statute may NOT be used to collaterally attack, set aside, or otherwise undermine a STATE COURT JUDGMENT.

On the other hand, there are ZERO district court of appeal cases that say you can.

This is the latest one of SEVEN reasons I have given you why your RICO complaint will be dismissed, which reasons include res judicata (issue preclusion), lack of racketeering activity, lack of a business injury directly caused by the alleged predicate acts, your attack on the 2006 judgment in 2016 is barred by the applicable four year statute of limitations, your conspiracy allegations are not “plausible” under Supreme Court Standards, there is no “criminal enterprise” separate and apart from Cohen’s personal activities, the complaint is barred by Rooker-Feldman, the complaint violates rule 8 pleading standards (is prolix), routine transmission of pleadings to a court for filings is not “mail fraud”, perjury is not a predicate act under RICO, you have not plausibly alleged “extortion”, and (NOW), RICO may not be used as a tool to set aside a state court judgment at all. Any one of these reasons is good grounds to dismiss.

I don’t know how many of these reason will be cited by the district court when it dismisses your complaint with prejudice, but if the Honorable Stephen V. Wilson composes the order, it will be through (as is his custom).

As an aside, Judge Wilson is a former Assistant US Attorney (who prosecuted organized crime cases, including RICO cases), was appointed to the federal bench in 1984, and in the 32 years Judge Wilson has been on the bench he has presided over hundreds of civil and criminal RICO cases and scores of RICO trials.

All seven reasons I have cited why your RICO complaint must be dismissed with prejudice under section 1915 (e), Judge Wilson already knows without even having to look them up.

You have dropped a lot of paper on the court (650 pages) for the judge or magistrate to read and digest, and depending on Judge Wilson’s trial schedule right now, it may be a week or two before he finishes writing an order of dismissal that covers all of your 13 causes of action, but you can bet this case will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Just on its face, seeking to file suit in 2016 to set aside a 2006 state court judgment just cannot succeed. The you drill down and analyze the legal obstacles to such a suit, and it is not even arguable. Do doubt. No chance of your complaint surviving dismissal. None.

From: Kelley Lynch [mailto:kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, May 15, 2016 3:55 PM
To: Stephen Gianelli; *irs. commissioner; Washington Field; ASKDOJ; : Division, Criminal; Dennis; bruce
Subject: Fwd: EVERY FEDERAL CIRCUIT TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE HAS HELD THAT THE RICO STATUTE MAY NOT BE USED TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK OR TO OVERTURN A STATE-COURT JUDGMENT

Gianelli,

Cease and desist. Donziger’s brief is not the opinion of the court. I have no idea who would permit you to represent them. The man lost. When there is fraud upon the court, one is permitted to attack it. See also Hazel Atlas.

Kelley Lynch

———- Forwarded message ———-
From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 2:27 AM
Subject: EVERY FEDERAL CIRCUIT TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE HAS HELD THAT THE RICO STATUTE MAY NOT BE USED TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK OR TO OVERTURN A STATE-COURT JUDGMENT
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

First, note that the case that Kelley Lynch relies on, Kougasian v. Tmsl Inc., is not a RICO case and therefore does not stand in opposition to any of the federal circuit court of appeal authorities cited in Dozinger’s appeal brief for the proposition that EVERY FEDERAL CIRCUIT TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE HAS HELD THAT THE RICO STATUTE MAY NOT BE USED TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK OR TO OVERTURN A STATE-COURT JUDGMENT ALLEGEDLY PROCURED BY FRAUD. These cases do not even rely on Rooker-Feldman, they rely on principles of res judicata and the need for finality of judgments.

See attached, yellow highlighted portions of text.

_________________________________________________________________

From: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 6:44 AM
Subject:
To: Robert Kory <rkory@koryrice.com>, Michelle Rice <mrice@koryrice.com>, “*irs. commissioner” <*IRS.Commissioner@irs.gov>, Washington Field <washington.field@ic.fbi.gov>, ASKDOJ <ASKDOJ@usdoj.gov>, “: Division, Criminal” <Criminal.Division@usdoj.gov>, “Doug.Davis” <Doug.Davis@ftb.ca.gov>, Dennis <Dennis@riordan-horgan.com>, MollyHale <MollyHale@ucia.gov>, fsb <fsb@fsb.ru>, rbyucaipa <rbyucaipa@yahoo.com>, khuvane <khuvane@caa.com>, blourd <blourd@caa.com>, Robert MacMillan <robert.macmillan@gmail.com>, a <anderson.cooper@cnn.com>, wennermedia <wennermedia@gmail.com>, Mick Brown <mick.brown@telegraph.co.uk>, “glenn.greenwald” <glenn.greenwald@firstlook.org>, Harriet Ryan <harriet.ryan@latimes.com>, “hailey.branson” <hailey.branson@latimes.com>, Stan Garnett <stan.garnett@gmail.com>, Mike Feuer <mike.feuer@lacity.org>, “mayor.garcetti” <mayor.garcetti@lacity.org>, Opla-pd-los-occ <OPLA-PD-LOS-OCC@ice.dhs.gov>, “Kelly.Sopko” <Kelly.Sopko@tigta.treas.gov>, Whistleblower <whistleblower@judiciary-rep.senate.gov>, Attacheottawa <AttacheOttawa@ci.irs.gov>, tips@radaronline.com, alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>, bruce <bruce@brucecutler.com>

Kory & Rice,

I continue to be bombarded by harassing emails from co-conspirator Stephen Gianelli. I have yet to meet a lawyer who spends this much time on their own clients and yet Gianelli has spent over seven years harassing me over Leonard Cohen, arguing his legal positions, and inserting extraneous issues into other matters (including DA Steve Cooley into the Tax Court case when he attempt to infiltrate the IRS Chief Trial Counsel’s Office which was and remains fascinating). This man has also spent seven years terrorizing my sons, contacting my elderly parents, harassing and stalking witnesses who provided declarations, and has most definitely engaged in blatantly criminal conduct with many people. I will remind you that I am now in possession of Rice’s emails urging Gianelli to continue harassing me (because it makes her “rich as fuck”) and Kory’s urging this criminal to bcc him on the harassing emails. I intend to file state bar complaints against the three of you this week. I also intend to write the Senate Finance Committee members about Leonard Cohen’s use of a fraudulent state court complaint narrative (and possibly some version of the fabricated expense ledger) to apply for and obtain fraudulent tax refunds. I will also strongly urge the Senate Finance Committee to audit LA Superior Court and the City Attorney with respect to the fraudulent DMV order and assignment of a fraudulent dating relationship based on a Colorado order issued without findings that was not a DMV order.

I personally do not find Donziger’s brief, which is not the court’s decision in Chevron, unimpressive. However, should the court approve my so-called “merit” review then you should argue these issues directly with the court. I am also not particularly interested in the 10th Circuit’s case. My RICO suit does not attempt to attack a state court judgment. The judgment was procured by fraud and the court should not provide it with any validity. Furthermore, I was not served. I believe that was the point of not communicating with me when I immediately brought the situation to Cohen’s lawyers’ attention. Any reputable law firm would have immediately seen to it that I was served but Cohen elected to file his tax returns, amend others, and apply for/obtain fraudulent tax refunds. I do think the IRS should seriously question why Cohen believes he has the right to conceal the fact that he borrowed/caused to be expended over $7 million in TH corporate assets. I also would like IRS to explain what “mistake” in my ownership interest in that entity was “rectified,” why I was included as a partner, and why I paid taxes based on documents prepared by Cohen’s personal corporate and tax lawyer. That will not resolve the fact that the assets are owned by Blue Mist Touring Company, Inc. – or, according to Rice, simply “out there” or why/how the assets of suspended corporations were transferred to Cohen during their suspension. That would of course now include the renewal of judgment and attempt to extort millions from me in financial interest. These are just some of the issues I’ve asked IRS to address.

I personally believe the court should take into consideration the fact that the failure to serve me, attempts to argue claims preclusion, and the running of statute of limitations was knowing, willful, and part of the scheme to defraud, extort, destroy, and discredit me.

This conduct with your co-conspirator should cease and desist.

Kelley Lynch

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>

Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 2:27 AM
Subject: EVERY FEDERAL CIRCUIT TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE HAS HELD THAT THE RICO STATUTE MAY NOT BE USED TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK OR TO OVERTURN A STATE-COURT JUDGMENT
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

First, note that the case that Kelley Lynch relies on, Kougasian v. Tmsl Inc., is not a RICO case and therefore does not stand in opposition to any of the federal circuit court of appeal authorities cited in Dozinger’s appeal brief for the proposition that EVERY FEDERAL CIRCUIT TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE HAS HELD THAT THE RICO STATUTE MAY NOT BE USED TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK OR TO OVERTURN A STATE-COURT JUDGMENT ALLEGEDLY PROCURED BY FRAUD. These cases do not even rely on Rooker-Feldman, they rely on principles of res judicata and the need for finality of judgments.

See attached, yellow highlighted portions of text.

Attached: Corrected Brief for Donziger

EXCERPT FROM APPELLANT STEVEN DONZIGER’S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL IN THE CHEVRON V. DOZIGER MATTER

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 15, 2016 at 4:02 AM
Subject: Every federal appellate court to consider issue held RICO may NOT be used to set aside state-court J based on alleged fraud
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

See yellow highlighting.

749 F.3d 1180 (2014)

Judy KNIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, and
PHOENIX CENTRAL, INC.; Mini Malls of America; John Doe, unknown investors in Mooring #1 thru xx; Jane Doe, unknown investors in Mooring #1 thru xx, Plaintiffs,
v.
MOORING CAPITAL FUND, LLC; Mooring Financial Corporation; John Jacquemin, Defendants-Appellees, and
David Nalls; John Doe; Jane Doe; Counsels and Agents of Defendants, Defendants.

No. 13-6112.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

April 22, 2014.

1182*1182 Submitted on the briefs:[*]

Judy Knight, filed a brief pro se.

Leif E. Swedlow, Andrews Davis, P.C., Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before HARTZ, McKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Judy Knight appeals from the dismissal of her lawsuit on the grounds of untimeliness, failure to state a claim, and claim preclusion (res judicata). We affirm the judgment below. Most of our reasons for affirmance are routine. But this appeal does raise interesting questions regarding claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, based on alleged misconduct in prior litigation.

Background

In 2010 this court decided two appeals involving claims and cross-claims between, on one side, Ms. Knight and her company Phoenix Central Inc. (Phoenix), an Oklahoma corporation, and, on the other side, Mooring Capital Fund, LLC (Capital) and Mooring Financial Corporation (Financial). See Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Knight, 388 Fed.Appx. 814 (10th Cir.2010) (Mooring I). Two years later, Ms. Knight filed a new suit in Oklahoma state court on behalf of herself, Phoenix, and another of 1183*1183 her companies, Mini Malls of America, also an Oklahoma corporation. The defendants were Capital and Financial and individuals associated with them, including Financial’s Chief Executive Officer, John Jacquemin, and unnamed “Counsels and Agents of Defendants.” R. at 15. Capital, Financial, and Mr. Jacquemin removed the litigation to federal district court.

The removing defendants moved to dismiss with prejudice. In addition to filing a response, Ms. Knight filed a first amended complaint that named as additional defendants the law firm and individual lawyers who represented Capital and Financial in Mooring I (the Counsel Defendants). Capital, Financial, and Mr. Jacquemin then moved to dismiss the first amended complaint with prejudice. Citing claim preclusion, the statute of limitations, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court granted the motion the next day. In the same order, the court sua sponte dismissed the claims against the other defendants.

The day after the district court filed its judgment dismissing the action with prejudice, Ms. Knight filed a motion to remand the case to state court, which the district court denied as moot. Ms. Knight then filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 motion to vacate, alter, or amend the dismissal order, which the district court also denied. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Knight sent an e-mail message seeking the district judge’s recusal. The court ordered the e-mail to be filed and denied the request for recusal. Ms. Knight has appealed.[1] We affirm. The removal of the case to federal court was proper. Some of Ms. Knight’s claims were untimely and the others fail to state a claim or are barred by issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). And her request for recusal was untimely.

Analysis
Issues Concerning Removal
District Court’s Jurisdiction

We first consider Ms. Knight’s challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction, reviewing the issue de novo, see Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir.2006). The district court may exercise removal jurisdiction over “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In removing the action, defendants primarily relied upon diversity jurisdiction, but they also cited federal-question jurisdiction. We need not consider the arguments regarding diversity jurisdiction because Ms. Knight’s assertion of federal-law claims under RICO supports federal-question jurisdiction. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). On appeal Ms. Knight appears to argue that she did not assert any federal-law claims. That argument is undermined, however, by the plain text of both her original and first amended complaints.

Counsel Defendants’ Consent to Removal

The case was removed to federal court by Capital, Financial, and Mr. Jacquemin. Ms. Knight argues that removal was improper because the Counsel Defendants did not join in or consent to the removal, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). But consent is required 1184*1184 only of “defendants who have been properly joined and served,” id., and Ms. Knight, although asserting that she mailed a summons and complaint to the Counsel Defendants, has failed to demonstrate that they had been properly served at the time of removal.

Because the action was in Oklahoma state court before removal, we examine Oklahoma’s service requirements. Oklahoma allows service by mail on individuals and entities. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2)(a). It is not clear, however, that Oklahoma would allow a pro se party to mail service. Section 2004(C)(2)(a) implies the contrary by specifying that service by mail can be accomplished “by the plaintiff’s attorney, any person authorized to serve process pursuant to subparagraph a of paragraph 1 of this section [listing sheriff or deputy sheriff, licensed process server, or person specially appointed to serve process], or by the court clerk.”

But even assuming that pro se plaintiffs can accomplish service by mail under Oklahoma law, the record in this case contains no evidence that service was so accomplished, much less that it was accomplished before the filing of the notice of removal. For service by mail in Oklahoma, one must “mail[] a copy of the summons and petition by certified mail, return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee.” Id. § 2004(C)(2)(b). “Service by mail shall be effective on the date of receipt or if refused, on the date of refusal of the summons and petition by the defendant.” Id. § 2004(C)(2)(a). Although Ms. Knight states that she mailed a summons and complaint via registered mail, return receipt requested, to one lawyer and the law firm, her unsupported assertions are insufficient to show that she complied with the relevant service requirements. The record does not contain any return receipts showing the date of delivery or any other evidence that the documents actually were properly addressed, were deposited in the mail, and were delivered or refused. See Chester v. Green, 120 F.3d 1091, 1091 (10th Cir.1997) (plaintiff failed to show service because there was “no authenticating post office stamp on any receipt showing they actually passed through the mails, nor [was] there a receipt or acknowledgment showing actual delivery of the complaint to the purported defendants”); Colclazier & Assocs. v. Stephens, 277 P.3d 1285, 1290 (Okla.Civ.App.2012) (“[A]bsent any documentary evidence supporting the Law Firm’s claim of attempted mailings, the district court could not have determined that service by mail had been made.”). Since Ms. Knight has failed to establish that the Counsel Defendants were served before the date of removal, their consent to removal was not required.

Dismissal of Claims

Ms. Knight challenges the district court’s application of statutes of limitations, Rule 12(b)(6), and claim preclusion. For ease of analysis, we divide her claims into two categories — first, claims concerning events that occurred before the Mooring I litigation (Phase 1 claims), and, second, claims concerning events that occurred during the Mooring I proceedings (Phase 2 claims). We address each category separately. Our review is de novo. See Wallace v. Microsoft Corp., 596 F.3d 703, 705 (10th Cir.2010) (statute of limitations); Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir.2010) (Rule 12(b)(6)); Valley View Angus Ranch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Field Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th Cir.2007) (preclusion).

Phase 1 Claims

The Phase 1 claims are claims based on events before Mooring I. They include claims that were asserted but failed in 1185*1185 Mooring I and claims that could have been asserted but were not. It was proper for the district court to dismiss these claims on the ground that any applicable limitations period had expired.

The Phase 1 claims predate Mooring I, which began in state court in September 2005 and was removed to federal court in January 2006. The present action was not filed until July 2012. By then, any Phase 1 claims clearly were untimely. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 95(A)(1) (five-year limitations period for actions upon written contracts, agreements, and promises); id. § 95(A)(2) (three-year limitations period for oral contracts and liabilities created by statute); id. § 95(A)(3) (two-year limitations period for torts and fraud); Dummar v. Lummis, 543 F.3d 614, 621 (10th Cir. 2008) (four-year limitations period for federal RICO claims); Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1409(E) (five-year limitations period for Oklahoma RICO claims).

Phase 2 Claims

The Phase 2 claims are those claims concerning events that occurred during Mooring I. They include claims that the defendants committed fraud and deceit in their filings and testimony and that their litigation conduct was tortious. It was proper for the district court to dismiss the Phase 2 claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and on the ground of preclusion (although the appropriate preclusion doctrine is issue preclusion, not claim preclusion).

Claims Under Oklahoma Law

The majority of the Phase 2 claims are claims under Oklahoma law. Oklahoma, however, has afforded participants in judicial proceedings an absolute immunity against later civil suits grounded in litigation conduct. See Patel v. OMH Med. Ctr., Inc., 987 P.2d 1185, 1202 (Okla. 1999) (“To the extent [plaintiff’s] petition relies on perjurious testimony as the basis of her claim for damages, whether denominated perjury, fraud, deceit, or `prima facie tort’, the petition fails to state a claim.”); id. at 1202-03 (remedies for litigation-related misconduct must be pursued in the litigated case, or by criminal or bar-discipline proceedings); Cooper v. Parker-Hughey, 894 P.2d 1096, 1098-1101 (Okla. 1995) (absolute immunity for witness testimony; no civil cause of action for perjury); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 945, 954 (Okla.1990) (barring claim of defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress against attorneys, parties, or witnesses founded on communications made in preparation for contemplated judicial proceeding); Hartley v. Williamson, 18 P.3d 355, 358 (Okla.Civ.App.2000) (barring claims for negligence, deceit, and conspiracy founded on testimony at judicial proceeding); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-35, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (immunity of parties and witnesses); Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1570-71 (10th Cir.1991) (Briscoe immunity extends to alleged conspiracies to commit perjury).

Further, Ms. Knight cannot bring suit under the Oklahoma RICO statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1401-1419. That statute restricts standing to bring “any proceedings, civil or criminal” to “the Attorney General, any district attorney or any [specially appointed] district attorney.” Id. § 1404(C); see also id. § 1409(A) (“The Attorney General, any district attorney or any [special] district attorney … may institute civil proceedings….”); id. § 1419 (construction of Oklahoma RICO may follow construction of federal RICO, “provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to provide for any private right of action or confer any civil remedy except as specifically set out in this act”).

Accordingly, the Oklahoma-law Phase 2 claims failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

1186*1186 b. RICO Claims

The remaining Phase 2 claims are the federal RICO claims. For these claims, Ms. Knight asserts that defendants made misrepresentations to the district court, through pleadings and testimony, that increased the cost of litigating Mooring I and caused the district court to rule against her on her individual claims in Mooring I. She alleges that this activity violated the federal wire-fraud and mail-fraud statutes, and thereby constituted a pattern of racketeering in violation of RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). In light of the Mooring I judgment, however, she is barred from bringing these claims.

An essential element of a RICO claim is that the plaintiff was injured in her business or property by the RICO violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (creating a civil cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962”); Deck v. Engineered Laminates, 349 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir.2003) (“[A] plaintiff has standing to bring a RICO claim only if he was injured in his business or property by reason of the defendant’s violation of § 1962.”). But, as explained below, the damages Ms. Knight alleges from Phase 2 conduct — increased litigation costs and lost claims — were matters resolved by Mooring I. Further litigation of these issues is therefore precluded, and the Phase 2 RICO claims cannot proceed unless and until Ms. Knight obtains relief from the judgment in Mooring I. See Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 56 F.3d 1268, 1272-73 (10th Cir.1995) (plaintiffs could not pursue fraud claims based on litigation misconduct without first obtaining relief from prior judgment because their claims of damages from fraud were incompatible with facts necessarily decided in the prior action).

Because Mooring I is a federal judgment in a diversity action applying Oklahoma law, Oklahoma’s preclusion law applies. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508, 121 S.Ct. 1021, 149 L.Ed.2d 32 (2001). In this case the appropriate preclusion doctrine is issue preclusion. We recognize that the district court relied on claim preclusion rather than issue preclusion, but we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 760 (10th Cir.2010). And the defendants raised both claim preclusion and issue preclusion in the district court, so Ms. Knight had an opportunity to address both doctrines. See id.

“Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of facts and issues actually litigated and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or their privies.” Durham v. McDonald’s Rests. Of Okla., Inc., 256 P.3d 64, 66 (Okla. 2011) (emphasis omitted).

To establish issue preclusion, a party must prove: 1) that the party against whom it is being asserted was either a party to or a privy of a party to the prior action; 2) that the issue subject to preclusion has actually been adjudicated in the prior case; 3) that the adjudicated issue was necessary and essential to the outcome of that prior case; and 4) the party against whom it is interposed had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or critical issue.

Id. at 66-67 (emphasis omitted). “The principle of issue preclusion operates to bar from relitigation both correct and erroneous resolutions of jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional challenges.” Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. McCrady, 176 P.3d 1194, 1199 (Okla.2007). “An issue is actually litigated and necessarily determined if it is properly raised in the pleadings, or otherwise submitted for determination, and judgment would not have been rendered 1187*1187 but for the determination of that issue.” Id.

Before examining the applicability of issue preclusion to the two types of damage alleged by Ms. Knight — increased litigation costs in Mooring I and her loss on the merits in Mooring I — we address three potential grounds for not applying preclusion doctrine to her federal RICO claims. First, Ms. Knight asserts that the defendants other than Capital and Financial (namely, the individual defendants and the law firm) cannot rely on preclusion because they were not parties in Mooring I. Those other defendants, however, are in privity with Capital and Financial. See Plotner v. AT & T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th Cir.2000) (“The law firm defendants appear by virtue of their activities as representatives of [other defendants], also creating privity.”); Fox v. Maulding, 112 F.3d 453, 459-60 (10th Cir.1997) (officers and directors of bank were privies of bank for purposes of RICO claims because allegations related to actions taken in their capacities as officers and directors). “In light of the circumstances of this case, including the alleged relationship between the defendants in this and the previous trial, we think that Oklahoma would not prohibit the defensive assertion of collateral estoppel on the sole grounds that the defendants here were not parties to the previous action.” Robinson, 56 F.3d at 1272 n. 3.

Second, Ms. Knight complains that the defendants did not submit the entire record from Mooring I in support of their preclusion argument. The district court, however, could take judicial notice of its own records to evaluate preclusion. See Gee, 627 F.3d at 1194.

Third, we consider the possibility that issue preclusion does not apply here because Ms. Knight’s complaint enables her to set aside the judgment in Mooring I, eliminating any preclusive effect that it may have. We reject the possibility for the following reasons.

To begin with, the remedies under RICO do not include setting aside a prior judgment or undermining its preclusive effect by a collateral attack. The circuits to consider the matter have rejected such relief. See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-LWood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir.1988) (“RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.”); see also Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50 (5th Cir.2008) (RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award); Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, 387 F.3d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir.2004) (RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world).

Moreover, Ms. Knight’s complaint does not support a direct attack on the Mooring I judgment under either Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) (court may relieve a party of a judgment for “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party”) or an action based on fraud on the court, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(d)(3) (Rule 60 “does not limit a court’s power to … set aside a judgment for fraud on the court”). If construed as a motion under Rule 60(b)(3) (which would need to have been filed in Mooring I in any event), the motion was untimely under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1) (one-year time limit for Rule 60(b)(3) motions). And the complaint’s allegations regarding defendants’ litigation misconduct fail to rise to the level of a claim for fraud on the court. See Plotner, 224 F.3d at 1170 (fraud on the court “refers to misrepresentation direct[ly] affecting 1188*1188 the judicial process, not simply the non-disclosure to one party of facts known by another”); Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 553 (10th Cir.1996) (allegations of “material misrepresentations or omitted information needed to make … answers fully truthful … simply do not rise to the level necessary to constitute `fraud on the court’”); Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir.1985) (en banc) (“Fraud on the court … is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury…. It is thus fraud where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function — thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted.”).

We now examine the elements of issue preclusion with respect to Ms. Knight’s two categories of alleged damages.

Increased Costs in Mooring I

As one item of damages, Ms. Knight asserts that defendants’ fraud unnecessarily increased the costs of litigating Mooring I. But the parties’ conduct, and its relation to the fees and costs incurred, were issues in Mooring I.

After the trial, both sides moved for awards of attorney fees. Phoenix requested an award of $224,392.17 against Capital and Financial, and Capital and Financial requested an award of $306,644.34 against Ms. Knight. See Mooring I, 388 Fed. Appx. at 818. The district court granted the motions in part, awarding Phoenix $49,000 and awarding Capital and Financial $88,000. Id. As part of its determination, “the district court declined to find that Capital and Financial acted in bad faith [and] assessed blame for the protracted litigation on all parties, not just Capital and Financial.” Id. at 828; see also id. at 826 (district court “observed that both parties’ fees were unreasonable [and] that both parties contributed to the excessive fees”). Phoenix appealed the amount of the fees awarded to it, and Ms. Knight appealed the award in favor of Capital and Financial against her. See id. at 818, 825-28.

On appeal Ms. Knight argued “that Capital and Financial do not deserve an award of fees because of their bad faith and misconduct” and that the district court “did not properly weigh that Capital and Financial created the situation that led to increased fees.” Id. at 827. This court held, however, that the district court “thoughtfully reviewed the case, taking into account” the proper factors in determining a fee award. Id. Further, this court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find that Capital and Financial acted in bad faith and in assessing blame for increased costs on all the parties. See id. at 828.

All the elements of issue preclusion are met as to Ms. Knight’s claim of RICO damages from the increased costs of litigating Mooring I. Ms. Knight, individually, was a party in Mooring I. As discussed above, the district court actually adjudicated the parties’ responsibility for the fees and costs incurred in litigating the action. The district court considered Ms. Knight’s allegations of misconduct, but it specifically declined to find that Capital and Financial acted in bad faith. If they did not act in bad faith, they could not have acted fraudulently; therefore, Ms. Knight’s current claim of damage would require her to establish facts that are incompatible with Mooring I. Further, the adjudication was necessary and essential to the court’s determination of the parties’ motions for fees and costs.

As to the final element of issue preclusion, Ms. Knight argues that because of 1189*1189 defendants’ fraudulent conduct, she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims in Mooring I. We disagree. In large part, “full and fair opportunity” focuses on procedural due process and fundamental fairness. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated:

Issue preclusion … is an equitable doctrine. Where the parties’ alignment and the raised legal and factual issues warrant and fairness to the parties is not compromised by the process, its application is appropriate. It is indeed the proceeding’s substance and the degree of due process inherent in it, rather than its form, which is the court’s bellwether for the doctrine’s application.

Cities Serv. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 980 P.2d 116, 126 (Okla.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). And in a case arising from Oklahoma, this court wrote, “The requirement that the party against whom the prior judgment is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to be heard centers on the fundamental fairness of preventing the party from relitigating an issue he has lost in a prior proceeding.” Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1521 (10th Cir.1990).

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has identified several relevant factors in evaluating this element:

(1) whether the [party] had ample incentive to litigate the issue fully in the earlier proceeding; (2) whether the judgment or order for which preclusive effect is sought is itself inconsistent with one or more earlier judgments in the [party’s] favor; … (3) whether the second action affords the [party] procedural opportunities unavailable in the first that could readily produce a different result; … [(4)] whether the current litigation’s legal demands are closely aligned in time and subject matter to those in the earlier proceedings; [(5)] whether the present litigation was clearly foreseeable … at the time of the earlier proceedings; and [(6)] whether in the first proceeding the [party] had sufficient opportunity to be heard on the issue.

Cities Serv. Co., 980 P.2d at 125 (footnotes omitted); see also Sil-Flo, 917 F.2d at 1521 (“Often, the inquiry will focus on whether there were significant procedural limitations in the prior proceeding, whether the party had the incentive to litigate fully the issue, or whether effective litigation was limited by the nature or relationship of the parties.”); Restatement (2d) of Judgments §§ 28, 29 (listing factors that may justify not applying preclusion).[2]

Nothing in this appeal indicates that applying issue preclusion would be fundamentally unfair to Ms. Knight. She had the opportunity to be heard in Mooring I, including the opportunity to appeal to this court, and she had ample incentive to litigate the issue fully, given that Capital and Financial sought an award exceeding $300,000. We recognize that preclusion may not be appropriate when “the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action.” Restatement (2d) of Judgments § 28(5)(c). But Ms. Knight does not identify any arguments she would have made regarding fees and costs in Mooring I had it not been for defendants’ alleged fraud, does not offer any specific explanation of how defendants’ litigation misconduct affected her ability to litigate the issue of fees and costs in Mooring I, and does not allege 1190*1190 that there is evidence of litigation misconduct that was unavailable while Mooring I was pending.

Lost Claims in Mooring I

As another item of damages, Ms. Knight asserts that the defendants’ conduct caused the district court to rule against her on her individual claims in Mooring I. This court has recognized that a cause of action is a form of property for purposes of RICO. See Deck, 349 F.3d at 1259. But we decline to recognize a conclusively meritless claim as property under RICO, and Ms. Knight’s individual claims in Mooring I were declared to be meritless. See 388 Fed.Appx. at 818, 823-25. As with her litigation-costs argument, unless and until the Mooring I judgment is vacated, issue preclusion establishes conclusively that her claims in Mooring I lacked merit.

Each element of issue preclusion is satisfied with regard to Ms. Knight’s individual claims. She presented her individual claims to the court, and judgment was rendered against her. Id. at 818, 827. The adjudication of her claims was necessary and essential to the outcome of Mooring I. And Ms. Knight alleges no facts indicating that she lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate her individual claims in Mooring I. Rather than offering any specific explanation of how defendants’ litigation misconduct prevented her from adequately presenting her individual claims, she makes only conclusory allegations that defendants’ misconduct caused the court to rule against her unjustly.

As long as the Mooring I judgment stands, Ms. Knight cannot plead an essential element of her Phase 2 RICO claim — namely, injury to a colorable cause of action. Dismissal of the claim is required under the doctrine of issue preclusion.

Remaining Arguments

Ms. Knight asserts that the dismissal decision was premature because the district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss before her deadline to file a motion to remand to state court and before her response period expired. She also complains that the district court granted judgment for some defendants sua sponte, it did not give her the opportunity to amend, and it dismissed her claims with prejudice. We see no reversible error. First, Ms. Knight was not prejudiced by the court’s taking action before she could move to remand, because such a motion would have failed. Second, although we disfavor (1) sua sponte dismissals and (2) dismissals before the losing party has an opportunity to respond, this court has held that such a “dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is not reversible error when it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged and allowing [her] an opportunity to amend [her] complaint would be futile.” McKinney v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir.1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, even though pro se parties generally should be given leave to amend, it is appropriate to dismiss without allowing amendment “where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts [s]he has alleged and it would be futile to give [her] an opportunity to amend.” Gee, 627 F.3d at 1195 (internal quotation marks omitted). And finally, “[a] dismissal with prejudice is appropriate where a complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and granting leave to amend would be futile,” Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.2006); see also Gee, 627 F.3d at 1181, 1195 (affirming dismissal with prejudice of claims barred by statute of limitations and claim preclusion). For the reasons discussed, it is patently obvious that Ms. Knight cannot proceed with her claims, 1191*1191 and any further opportunity to amend would be futile because her claims would still be barred. Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing claims sua sponte, in dismissing without affording Ms. Knight an opportunity to amend, or in dismissing the claims with prejudice.

Finally, Ms. Knight asserts that the district judge should have recused himself. But she did not request recusal until after the district court dismissed her action and denied her Rule 59 motion. That was too late. “We have held that under either 28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455, the party seeking recusal must act in a timely fashion to request recusal.” United States v. Stenzel, 49 F.3d 658, 661 (10th Cir.1995).

Rule 59 Motion

We review the denial of a Rule 59 motion for abuse of discretion. See Price v. Wolford, 608 F.3d 698, 706 (10th Cir.2010). Because we have found no reversible error, we also find no abuse of discretion in denying the Rule 59 motion.

III. Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

[*] After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

[1] Ms. Knight filed notices of appeal naming as appellants herself and her two corporations. We have previously explained to Ms. Knight that as a nonattorney she cannot represent a corporation in federal court. See Mooring I, 388 Fed.Appx. at 823. No counsel has filed a notice of appeal or appeared for the entities. Consequently, Ms. Knight is the only appellant, and we do not consider any arguments regarding the entities’ claims.

[2] The Oklahoma Supreme Court has relied on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as authority. See, e.g., Johnson v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2 P.3d 334, 337 (Okla.2000); Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp., 920 P.2d 122, 132 (Okla.1996)

________________________________________________________________

From: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, May 13, 2016 at 2:44 PM
Subject: The Criminal Stalker/Co-Conspirator
To: “*irs. commissioner” <*IRS.Commissioner@irs.gov>, Washington Field <washington.field@ic.fbi.gov>, ASKDOJ <ASKDOJ@usdoj.gov>, “: Division, Criminal” <Criminal.Division@usdoj.gov>, “Doug.Davis” <Doug.Davis@ftb.ca.gov>, Dennis <Dennis@riordan-horgan.com>, MollyHale <MollyHale@ucia.gov>, fsb <fsb@fsb.ru>, rbyucaipa <rbyucaipa@yahoo.com>, khuvane <khuvane@caa.com>, blourd <blourd@caa.com>, Robert MacMillan <robert.macmillan@gmail.com>, a <anderson.cooper@cnn.com>, wennermedia <wennermedia@gmail.com>, Mick Brown <mick.brown@telegraph.co.uk>, “glenn.greenwald” <glenn.greenwald@firstlook.org>, Harriet Ryan <harriet.ryan@latimes.com>, “hailey.branson” <hailey.branson@latimes.com>, Stan Garnett <stan.garnett@gmail.com>, Mike Feuer <mike.feuer@lacity.org>, “mayor.garcetti” <mayor.garcetti@lacity.org>, Opla-pd-los-occ <OPLA-PD-LOS-OCC@ice.dhs.gov>, “Kelly.Sopko” <Kelly.Sopko@tigta.treas.gov>, Whistleblower <whistleblower@judiciary-rep.senate.gov>, Attacheottawa <AttacheOttawa@ci.irs.gov>, tips@radaronline.com, alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>, bruce <bruce@brucecutler.com>

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

These are the latest harassing emails from the Stalker/Co-conspirator. The District Court has jurisdiction to hear this case that is not simply “complaining” about a state court judgment. I wonder how much time has to pass before Cohen feels he needs to serve me the summons and complaint which I have not been served to date. The allegations of racketeering are plausible. Nevertheless, we are interested to see how much perjury and fraud is acceptable to our court system.

Gianelli’s excuse for why he is harassing me is pathetic. Are these the reasons he terrorized my sons for seven straight years; harassed everyone in my life; targeted, slandered and intimidated witnesses; and has vehemently attacked Paulette Brandt? This man has engaged in criminal conduct and that does not give him the right to continue with that conduct.

I was not fired for theft in 2004. The issue never arose. Cohen demanded that I hand over the corporate books and records, meet with him and his lawyer, and unravel these entities/transactions. I refused. I also turned down millions of dollars in settlement offers due to the fact that I was being asked to lie about Cohen’s representatives. Nothing about this situation is common sense to a reasonable person. Gianelli is a lawyer who represents Leonard Cohen’s legal interests.

I most certainly do not know that my RICO suit is about to be dismissed and if that is the case, it will be appealed. Furthermore, it will not be the end of the story with respect to the federal tax matters that have been implicated.

Kelley

___________________________________________________________

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, May 13, 2016 at 7:56 AM
Subject:
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

You just don’t get it. It is not the quantity of “fraud” you have alleged (“we are all curious to see how much fraud is enough”) it is a question of the district court’s jurisdiction to hear a case complaining about a state court judgment, the passage of time involved, the lack of plausible allegations of racketeering, res judicata and other fatal issues.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, May 13, 2016 at 4:07 AM
Subject:
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

Sorry, I misspoke, of course your suit will be dismissed WITH prejudice.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, May 13, 2016 at 3:53 AM
Subject:
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

No, I do not think I am Leonard Cohen (as I have made quite clear).

I think I am a retired guy whom you relentlessly harassed, inserted into your invested conspiracy theories, falsely reported to the IRS/FBI for all manner of made up offenses, and generally pissed off.

Now instead of cowering in a corner hoping in vain you go away like your typical harassment victim I am all up in your shit citing chapter and verse why all of your legal theories and successive court filings (to understate it) lack viability.

I am 10 for 10.

Not that it is rocket science.

The fact that you cannot get fired for theft in 2004, get sued for theft in 2005, sustain a judgment against you in 2006, wait until August of 2013 to move to set aside the default, file a second (unsuccessful) motion to set aside the default 14 months later, then file a federal court action asking for a determination of all of the issues raised by the 2005 complaint and 2006 judgment in 2016 is pretty much common sense to any reasonable person.

I am a lawyer, so I supplied – chapter and verse – all of the technical reasons why your 2016 250 page complaint (with 450 pages of physical exhibits and hundreds more housed on your blog) will be dismissed ON THE COURT’S OWN MOTION under section 1915 (e) BEFORE issuing a summons or bothering the defendants with the suit, citing statutes, rules of court and federal cases by volume, page number, and pinpoint citation page number and (where relevant) also attaching and citing relevant hearing transcripts by page and line number.

Leonard Cohen does not even know about your suit.

When it is dismissed by the court WITHOUT PREJUDICE I will be right for the 11th time in a row, and you will have been proven TO be out in left field – AGAIN.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 9:41 PM
Subject: RE: The Co-conspirator’s Latest “Batch” of Harassing Emails
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: PAULETTEBRANDT8@gmail.com

You are in no position to say on whose behalf I am writing. I am a 62 year old retired guy who lives in Europe and no one is paying me to set you straight on your fantasy bullshit. I wish someone would pay me but they aren’t and your assertion to the contrary is highly implausible, as is your conspiracy theory. I would go so far as to say stupid (to employ a technical legal term).

As should be quite obvious to you I am not shy and have no need to employ pseudonyms to communicate. Indeed, my email address has my full name in it. Also I do not make threats. I simply do (or not, as the case may be).

I am still licensed to practice law and as long as I am so licensed, I took an oath to obey the law, always have and will continue to do so.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 10:04 PM
Subject: RE: The Co-conspirator’s Latest “Batch” of Harassing Emails
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>, Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

I do not speak for Ms. Rice (or Leonard Cohen), but there is no need for ANYONE to direct any communications to the district court. No one has been served yet; indeed no summons has been issued.

These are not “arguments” nor are they based on California law. I am simply speaking legal truth. And I am not doing so on anyone’s behalf.

I have supplied you with volume and page citations to the federal reports. (e.g., Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008) – wherein the 9th Circuit held that Rooker-Feldman bars a federal suit arising from a state court judgment where the alleged “extrinsic fraud” was raised and rejected in the state court.)

Read those authorities or not and make up your own mind. But it won’t change the fact that the district court is going to sua sponte dismiss you case any day now.

‘From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 10:06 PM
Subject: RE: The Co-conspirator’s Latest “Batch” of Harassing Emails
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

Obviously, you now know your RICO suit is about to be dismissed, since you are now taking about the next frivolous lawsuit. Some people never learn.

_________________________________________________________________

From: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 1:08 PM
Subject: The Co-conspirator’s Latest “Batch” of Harassing Emails
To: “*irs. commissioner” <*IRS.Commissioner@irs.gov>, Washington Field <washington.field@ic.fbi.gov>, ASKDOJ <ASKDOJ@usdoj.gov>, “: Division, Criminal” <Criminal.Division@usdoj.gov>, “Doug.Davis” <Doug.Davis@ftb.ca.gov>, Dennis <Dennis@riordan-horgan.com>, MollyHale <MollyHale@ucia.gov>, fsb <fsb@fsb.ru>, rbyucaipa <rbyucaipa@yahoo.com>, khuvane <khuvane@caa.com>, blourd <blourd@caa.com>, Robert MacMillan <robert.macmillan@gmail.com>, a <anderson.cooper@cnn.com>, wennermedia <wennermedia@gmail.com>, Mick Brown <mick.brown@telegraph.co.uk>, “glenn.greenwald” <glenn.greenwald@firstlook.org>, Harriet Ryan <harriet.ryan@latimes.com>, “hailey.branson” <hailey.branson@latimes.com>, Stan Garnett <stan.garnett@gmail.com>, Mike Feuer <mike.feuer@lacity.org>, “mayor.garcetti” <mayor.garcetti@lacity.org>, Opla-pd-los-occ <OPLA-PD-LOS-OCC@ice.dhs.gov>, “Kelly.Sopko” <Kelly.Sopko@tigta.treas.gov>, Whistleblower <whistleblower@judiciary-rep.senate.gov>, Attacheottawa <AttacheOttawa@ci.irs.gov>, tips@radaronline.com, alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>, bruce <bruce@brucecutler.com>

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

Here are the latest batch of harassing emails. Gianelli is writing these emails for himself if he’s a schizophrenic who actually thinks he is Leonard Cohen. Before reviewing these emails, please reread Ann Diamond’s piece on this stalker. It’s helpful to have the views of a third party who has been harassed, stalked, insulted, and slandered by Leonard Cohen’s operative, proxy, and co-conspirator.

http://riverdeepbook.blogspot.com/2015/06/ann-diamond-on-stephen-gianelli_25.html

It is also important to keep in mind that Gianelli is using fake moniker email accounts to threaten other people such as Paulette Brandt. This email is definitely threatening Ms. Brandt who Gianelli has criminally harassed for over three straight years now. His alleged protected person appears to be his wife whose email address he included when harassing me with their Mexican travel plans.

From: Hunter-Seeker <hunterseeker@ghostmail.com>
Date: Wed, May 4, 2016 at 12:07 AM
Subject:
To: Paulette Brandt

Here is what happens next. If the crazy one even so much as annoys our protected person again, YOU are the one we are going to see, not her. We are involved because we are on the ground in Los Angeles.

We are informed that our friend’s family member does not use the account the crazy one has been emailing. That account is used for business purposes and managed by the person we protect.

For security reasons we are now monitoring all email accounts and relevant blogs.

[End of email threat]

Wikipedia: Hunter-seeker – “Ravening sliver of suspensor-buoyed metal guided as a weapon by a nearby control console; common assassination device.”[3] Floating in mid-air, it kills by entering the body and following nerve pathways to vital organs. A hunter-seeker is employed in Dune in an assassination attempt on Paul Atreides.[4]” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glossary_of_Dune_terminology#H

What is on my stalker’s mind this morning? My RICO suit, Rooker Feldman, and 9th Circuit decisions. I would assume Cohen has an entire team of lawyers thinking through his position that a fraud default judgment, theft, copyright infringement, tax fraud, etc. are all acceptable or, at the very least, protected activity in California.

I personally do not believe for one minute that a process server came to my house. Rutger, Chad, and I lived there. Chad’s bedroom was directly off the front door. There was a door bell so no one needed to knock. I was home consistently and they were home a great deal of the time. No one attempted to evade service. I asked Chad to phone Edelman to advise him that I wasn’t served and brought this to the attention of Cohen, Gibson Dunn, and Kory & Rice. This was irrelevant to these parties because it is obvious that Cohen’s intention was to file the fraudulent, baseless, and meritless complaint in order to tamper with the administration of justice in the Colorado matter, file and amend his personal tax returns, and apply for/obtain fraudulent tax refunds. Actually, what Judge Hess appears to be arguing is that anyone can lie about serving someone and there are little if any remedies – particularly if more than two years have passed. It seems like a highly problematic argument and one that is unconstitutional. I discovered the alleged Complaint online in April 2010. I have no idea if it is the actual complaint. I was not served and throwing a Complaint online is not service by any stretch of the imagination. I absolutely acted with diligence and the fact that Cohen willfully and knowingly bankrupted me should not be used to further injure me. He has had more lawyers than Phil Spector has in connection with his murder trial. At one point, there were at least six lawyers in the courtroom opposing me re. the motion for terminating sanctions (fraud upon the court) so clearly the motion wasn’t perceived as “frivolous.” There was and remains no Jane Doe. Leonard Cohen submitted documents to the court, including photographs of me (from well before and well after the alleged ate of service) arguing that I was the Jane Doe. I was not; this is further extrinsic fraud with respect to the service issue; and I have submitted evidence that I did not resemble the alleged Jane Doe. There were three people at my home, apart from me, on August 24, 2005. At no time did a process server come to my home that morning. Paulette Brandt was present at the January 17, 2014 hearing and willing to testify. Palden Ronge was present at the January 17, 2014 hearing and willing to testify. Joan Lynch, Clea Surkhang, Rutger Penick, and Daniel Meade were available to testify by CourtCall. They were not permitted to do so. This was not a full and fair hearing. I was not served so it would be impossible for Judge Hess to find that I was served. I have no idea what Judge Hess did or didn’t do. I know this for a fact – I was not served; the proof of service is evidence of extrinsic fraud; and it appears that Cohen acted willfully and knowingly when he realized I was not served and failed to serve me. By December 2005, Cohen seemed confident that he would obtain the fraudulent default judgment entered in May 2006. I believe that is due to the fact that he understood I was not served. In any event, I haven’t argued that Judge Hess made the wrong decision. Nor have I argued anything about the June 23, 2015 hearing. The motion for terminating sanctions (fraud upon the court) issue is under appeal.

Gianelli evidently visited a collection website for further information on Rooker-Feldman. It sounds outrageous that one could not attack an unconstitutional default judgment in federal court. In fact, the mere concept is mind-boggling. I see Cohen’s legal team are focused on “inextricably intertwined.” Obviously, the 9th Circuit determined that a judgment obtained through “extrinsic fraud” is not barred by Rooker Feldman. I have argued that the issue with the fraudulently obtained state court judgment is extrinsic fraud with respect to the proof of service. These issues are separate and apart from the fraud upon numerous U.S. District Courts. Furthermore, Hazel Atlas applies to this case. Gianelli’s arguments, on Cohen’s behalf, really drive home this point: the system works beautifully for the criminals.

KOUGASIAN v. TMSL INC

A. Alleged Extrinsic Fraud

Three of Kougasian’s causes of action are based, in whole or in part, on alleged extrinsic fraud on the state court.1  The alleged extrinsic fraud primarily consisted of submitting the false declaration to the state court in Kougasian I at the last minute and refusing to supply the telephone number or address of the declarant, thereby preventing Kougasian from deposing or otherwise questioning him.  “Extrinsic fraud is conduct which prevents a party from presenting his claim in court.”  Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir.1981).   Under California law, extrinsic fraud is a basis for setting aside an earlier judgment.   See Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc., 28 Cal.4th 249, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 187, 47 P.3d 1056, 1063 (2002).

At first glance, a federal suit alleging a cause of action for extrinsic fraud on a state court might appear to come within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   It is clear that in such a case the plaintiff is seeking to set aside a state court judgment.   But for Rooker-Feldman to apply, a plaintiff must seek not only to set aside a state court judgment;  he or she must also allege a legal error by the state court as the basis for that relief.   See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164(“If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal court.”) (emphasis added).   A plaintiff alleging extrinsic fraud on a state court is not alleging a legal error by the state court;  rather, he or she is alleging a wrongful act by the adverse party.   See id.  (“If, on the other hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.”).

It has long been the law that a plaintiff in federal court can seek to set aside a state court judgment obtained through extrinsic fraud.   In Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 80, 25 L.Ed. 407 (1878), the Supreme Court distinguished between errors by the state court, which could not be reviewed in federal circuit court, and fraud on the state court, which could be the basis for an independent suit in circuit court.  (The federal circuit court was a trial court at that time.)   Anticipating the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court wrote:

The question presented with regard to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is, whether the proceeding ․ is or is not in its nature a separate suit, or whether it is a supplementary proceeding so connected with the original suit as to form an incident to it, and substantially a continuation of it.   If the proceeding is merely tantamount to the common-law practice of moving to set aside a judgment for irregularity, or to a writ of error, or to a bill of review or an appeal, it would belong to the latter category, and the United States court could not properly entertain jurisdiction of the case.   Otherwise, the Circuit Courts of the United States would become invested with power to control the proceedings in the State courts, or would have appellate jurisdiction over them in all cases where the parties are citizens of different States.   Such a result would be totally inadmissible.

On the other hand, if the proceedings are tantamount to a bill in equity to set aside a decree for fraud in the obtaining thereof, then they constitute an original and independent proceeding, and according to the doctrine laid down in Gaines v. Fuentes (92 U.S. [ (2 Otto) ] 10, 23 L.Ed. 524), the case might be within the cognizance of the Federal courts.   The distinction between the two classes of cases may be somewhat nice, but it may be affirmed to exist.   In the one class there would be a mere revision of errors and irregularities, or of the legality and correctness of the judgments and decrees of the State courts;  and in the other class, the investigation of a new case arising upon new facts, although having relation to the validity of an actual judgment or decree, or the party’s right to claim any benefit by reason thereof.

Id. at 82-83 (emphasis added);  see also MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting the above passage).

Extrinsic fraud on a court is, by definition, not an error by that court.   It is, rather, a wrongful act committed by the party or parties who engaged in the fraud.   Rooker-Feldman therefore does not bar subject matter jurisdiction when a federal plaintiff alleges a cause of action for extrinsic fraud on a state court and seeks to set aside a state court judgment obtained by that fraud.

See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1253375.html#sthash.Tk5AjUub.dpuf

It’s quite clear that Leonard Cohen, and his army of lawyers, have intentionally chosen not to serve me, used the situation as an opportunity to tamper with the administration of justice with the U.S. District Court in Colorado, further used the situation to interfere with federal tax matters, and planned to run statute of limitations and argue res judicata. That’s part of the overall scheme to defraud and the federal court should take these issues into consideration because not only are they plausible, this is precisely what has occurred. A team of lawyers, representing celebrity Leonard Cohen, have obtained fraud default judgments, committed fraud upon numerous courts, and used fraudulent dime-a-dozen restraining orders to discredit me. LA Superior Court has now merely assigned me a “dating relationship” with a man who fantasizes about men holding guns on him, views himself as a CIA MK Ultra participant and recon during Bay of Pigs, and believes it is acceptable to rip his advisers off and falsely accuse people of a variety of things in order to breach contracts, etc. Steven Machat has a good grasp of who Cohen actually is. While Marty Machat was dying, Leonard Cohen personally went into his office and removed corporate books and records. This is another pattern of Leonard Cohen’s. He confiscates corporate property which allows him to steal from others. At this moment in time, he appears to have stolen from me, Machat & Machat, and Phil Spector. Leonard Cohen and his lawyers feel entitled to conduct themselves in the manner in which they have. Their focus is simultaneously on my fee waiver and the fact that Cohen willfully bankrupted me. The court should take that into consideration as well. Leonard Cohen has used the court system to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity and he feels entitled to do so. Leonard Cohen believes it is acceptable to lie under oath. And, Leonard Cohen thinks it is acceptable to blame his wrongdoing on others. I think the federal court should take a look at who Leonard Cohen actually is, what he and his lawyers have done here, and forget the fact that Cohen has intentionally projected himself onto the world stage as some religious sage.

Kelley

Gods, Gangsters & Honour by Steven Machat

Excerpts:

Leonard was desperate to get rid of this two managers, Judy Berger and Mary Martin, who he believed had stolen the rights to his songs and records early on in his career. Even back then, Cohen was convinced that women were ripping him off. He signed an agreement, and when he wanted to get rid of the contract, he accused everyone of ripping him off. You could say it became repeat behaviour. My father duly got rid of Berger and Martin, set up a new company called Stranger Music for Cohen and agreed to manage Leonard for 15% as well as 15% of Stranger. The idea of the company was twofold: one, to maintain ownership of the copyrights duly created; and two, to minimise Leonard’s exposure to American tax, just like any other rich individual trying to minimise their tax liabilities.

I’ve no problem with people trying to avoid tax, but as the years have passed, I couldn’t help but smile at the apparent contradiction between Leonard’s public persona and his private business arrangements. This was a supposedly devout Buddhist with no interest in material possessions, who was all the same happy to put his trust in business managers and companies he created with his knowledge and consent whose sole aim was to minimise tax liability.

Leonard then sold Stranger Music for a small fortune and I’ve seen nothing from Cohen.

Cohen controlled his copyright, not my father. The irony was that Cohen had total control over my father … Do you know what happened to the $400,000 worth of bearer bonds in my father’s office? Bearer bonds are just unregistered bonds or paper money that are used to conceal ownership and, with it, tax liabilities. Cristini told me (who knows if this is true?) that he had found the bonds in my father’s office hours after he had died but the next day they disappeared.

Cohen denied any knowledge of these bonds. I was unsure if they existed or were part of my father’s schemes cooked up to conceal Leonard’s money.

Cohen said: “Steven, you remember the 1988 tour? Flemming extorted $100,000 from me. He wanted 20% managerial commission, in addition to his promoter’s fees. He thought he was doing extra work for me and wanted me to pay him.”

Far from being the poet of the spirits, Leonard was a hustler using Buddhism as a facade.

It was clear that Leonard was also wary of me because, I guess, he thought I might be planning to sue him.

The whole scheme was so ridiculous [Leonard Cohen’s attempts to limit his liabilities on the deals] from the start. All Leonard had to do to avoid U.S. taxes was tear up his green card, and stop living in and using the U.S. as his base.

It’s no secret that Leonard has also made a killing on the art market by selling his paintings, plus his touring of the last two years … If that’s true, it doesn’t really tally with the clear implication from Cohen that he is a man who has been robbed of everything.

Leonard told me before I left that he had actually offered Kelley a settlement …

It’s clear that Cohen and his lawyers want to heap the blame on Kelley’s shoulders for more than just revenge. Because Cohen’s pension assets were cashed in … ahead of schedule they are liable to tax so they need to establish that this situation is her fault. The penalties could actually be greater than the tax itself.

Leonard has cast himself into a hell of his own making.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 3:23 AM
Subject:
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

You may wish to read Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008, or not, since it vaporizes your argument. It holds that even as to “extrinsic fraud” (e.g., the service issue only) Rooker-Feldman APPLIES where the state court (as in your case) heard and rejected your allegation of extrinsic fraud.

Here, the Reussers allege that Wachovia engaged in two acts of extrinsic fraud.   First, they allege that Wachovia failed to provide sufficient notice of its intent to seek a default judgment against the Reussers, in violation of Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure (“ORCP”) 69A(1).   Second, they allege that Wachovia failed to inform the state trial court that they had been served a copy of the Reussers’ petition contesting the merits of the FED proceeding.   The hitch in both contentions, however, is that they already have been litigated in Oregon state court.   In their motion to vacate the state default judgment, the Reussers argued that their failure to appear at the FED proceeding was supported by “good cause” under ORCP 71, due in part to the same alleged misconduct at the heart of the present suit.   The state court denied the Reussers’ motion and therefore left the default judgment intact.The Reussers contend that the state court’s refusal to vacate the default judgment cannot bar federal jurisdiction, because the state court did not specify the precise grounds on which its judgment rested.   Accordingly, they argue, it is possible that the state court denied their motion on a procedural ground, rather than deciding the merits of their claims.   However, the record reveals that the parties did not present a procedural argument before the state court either in their written motions or at the hearing that followed.   While the state court did not cite the specific grounds underlying its denial of the motion, it expressly indicated that its decision was based on its “review[of] the motion and pleadings in support of and opposition to the motion, and having heard argument from counsel,” and when asked at the hearing whether it had any questions concerning the case, the state court responded that it did not.   The only reasonable conclusions are that the state court refused to credit the Reussers’ factual allegations, or that it held that the allegations of “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party,” ORCP 71B(c), were insufficient to permit vacatur of the default judgment.   Thus, even drawing all “reasonable inferences from the complaint” in the Reussers’ favor, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Local 1 v. Stone, 502 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), we must conclude that the state court rejected the claimed extrinsic fraud on the merits.5 Accordingly, the Reussers’ § 1983 claims constitute a de facto appeal of a state court decision and are therefore barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   That is, even assuming that the misconduct that the Reussers allege rises to the level of extrinsic fraud, such claim was itself separately litigated before and rejected by an Oregon state court. – See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1400722.html#sthash.8NiFvIYG.dpuf

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 4:55 AM
Subject: Hearing 1-17-2014; Alleged “extrinsic fraud” re proof of service ALREADY DECIDED BY STATE COURT; Rooker-Feldman DOES APPLY even to the service issue
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

From the attached TR 1-17-2014

TRANSCRIPT OF THE 1-17-2014 HEARING ON MOTION TO VACATE IN COHEN V. LYNCH CASE NO. BC338322 POSTED BY KELLEY LYNCH ON SCRIBD.COM

4, lines 1-4 “You also have problems on the merits.”

9.26, line 8 to p. 15, line 1 “Now, you are arguing that the judgment is void because it was based on a false proof of service. […] a declaration by a registered process server is entitled to a presumption of correctness under Evidence Code section 647…and the fact that the process server knocks and gets no answer and the lights are on, inferentially supports that you didn’t answer…well somebody came to the door on this date…somebody came to the door apparently. Now, you know, since you do not have a valid declaration here to establish any evidence, you have a problem…And the Cohen declaration says that a photo take of you the summer of 2006 shows you with blond hair…the restraining order describes you as …blond…you know, not only was there service, but there was delivery to this Jane Doe and it was also mailed. You have not satisfactorily accounted for the mailing. It went to an address you were concededly living at. It was mailed to that address. Now, in addition, there was the request for entry of default which I understand you received by email…in addition, even if you could demonstrate extrinsic fraud and, frankly I don’t think you have demonstrated it, I don’t think you have carried your burden of proof that the declaration of the process server was false. ¶ You cannot show that you acted with diligence. You state that you found out about this action in April of 2010, but you provide absolutely zero explanation [of] why you waited until August 2013 […] you have not demonstrated that the proof of service of summons and complaint was false or indeed even questionable, nor have you shown any entitlement [to] any relief on any equitable basis. […] and I don’t see any diligence and I don’t see a basis for setting this aside, frankly.”

Clearly and without a doubt, you can disagree with Judge Hess’ ruling on January 17, 2014, but you cannot seriously dispute that Judge Hess considered and rejected your contentions that the proof of service was false and that there was “extrinsic fraud” on the merits. Judge Hess simply held that you failed to meet your burden of proving that the proof of service was false, in the face of affirmative evidence that you were indeed served as reflected in the proof of service, by delivery to “Jane Doe” and also with a copy of the suit mailed to the residence you admit you were living in at the time. Judge Hess expressly found at the hearing that you were in fact served.

Therefore, Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008) is right on point.

Essentially, you are not only seeking to overturn the CA judgment in BC338322, you are asking the district court to – in essence – hold that Judge Hess made the WRONG DECISION when he denied your motion to vacate on January 17, 2014 and that Judge Hess made the WRONG DECISION again on June 23, 2015 when he AGAIN denied your (second) request to set the 2006 judgment aside.

That is classic Rooker-Feldman, and the district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 5:14 AM
Subject: FYI; Rooker-Feldman bars federal court claims premised on lack of service; plaintiff must exhaust the state ct. appeals process and then seek review directly from the US Supreme Ct.
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com

Friday, May 7, 2010

Using The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine To Defeat federal Claims

As collection attorneys know, consumers often do not pay close attention to the collection process until the creditor already has a judgment and counsel has an order that allows for garnishing the consumer’s wages or attaching their bank accounts. These post-judgment collection efforts can spawn claims in federal court, where the consumers allege they were never served with the state court complaint, or that the state court judgment against them is somehow improper. Claims of this type, however, are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and are doomed to fail.

What exactly is the Rooker-Feldman doctrine anyway? As the Supreme Court recently observed, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents litigants from attacking a state court judgment by filing a subsequent federal lawsuit, “no matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be. (citations). Kelly v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “applies not only to claims that were actually raised before the state court, but also to claims that are inextricably intertwined with state court determinations.” Id. (citation omitted). A claim filed by a consumer in federal court is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision if “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules . . . .” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). Even a claim by a consumer that the state court judgment was obtained through “extrinsic fraud” is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Kelly case provides an excellent example of how the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can bar an FDCPA claim. There, the plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims alleged that the state court judgments defendants had obtained included sums for attorneys’ fees that were not permitted by contract or law. See Kelley, 548 F.3d at 602. When defendants raised the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, plaintiffs argued their claims were not barred, because they were only challenging “defendants’ representations and requests related to attorney fees, and not the state court judgments granting those requests.” Id. at 604. The Kelly court rejected this argument, noting that the state court had determined the fees were proper, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule that the holding was erroneous:

“Because defendants needed to prevail in state court in order to capitalize on the alleged fraud, the FDCPA claims that plaintiffs bring ultimately require us to evaluate the state court judgments. We could not determine that defendants’ representations and requests related to attorney fees violated the law without determining that the state court erred by issuing judgments granting the attorney fees.”

Id. at 605.

More recently, in Bryant v. Gordon & Wong Group, P.C., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-15401 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010), the plaintiff sued a collection law firm, claiming he had never been served with the complaint in the state court collection action, and that “out of the blue” he discovered his checking and savings accounts had been garnished. See Bryant, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. The court rejected the claim, noting that by “disputing the garnishment of his accounts, Plaintiff is inherently challenging the entry of default against him and the writ of execution that authorized the garnishment.” Id. at 1208. Summary judgment was granted for defendant under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, because plaintiff’s claims were seeking to undermine the judgments entered against him in state court. The court held:

“The net effect is that Plaintiff is seeking to undermine the state court judgments. These judgments were rendered before the current district court proceeding, and any action by this Court in favor of Plaintiff on his claims would necessarily require review of those state court judgments. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine specifically bars this Court from doing so. If Plaintiff believes he has been wronged by the actions of the state court, he must turn to the state for remedy. This Court lacks jurisdiction to provide redress for Plaintiff’s claims.”

Id.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a key defense in cases like Kelly and Bryant, where a consumer is pursuing claims that would undermine the validity of a state court judgment or its findings. The collector should move for summary judgment on the grounds that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. See Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898 (district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if claims raised in federal action are inextricably intertwined with state court decision).

If a consumer has a problem with a state court judgment, he cannot attack the judgment or undermine it using the federal courts. He must seek relief from the judgment utilizing the procedures available under state law. “A state litigant seeking review of a state court judgment must follow the appellate process through the state court system and then directly to the United States Supreme Court.” Kelley, 548 F.3d at 603.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 3:23 AM
Subject:
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

You may wish to read Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008, or not, since it vaporizes your argument. It holds that even as to “extrinsic fraud” (e.g., the service issue only) Rooker-Feldman APPLIES where the state court (as in your case) heard and rejected your allegation of extrinsic fraud.

Here, the Reussers allege that Wachovia engaged in two acts of extrinsic fraud.   First, they allege that Wachovia failed to provide sufficient notice of its intent to seek a default judgment against the Reussers, in violation of Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure (“ORCP”) 69A(1).   Second, they allege that Wachovia failed to inform the state trial court that they had been served a copy of the Reussers’ petition contesting the merits of the FED proceeding.   The hitch in both contentions, however, is that they already have been litigated in Oregon state court.   In their motion to vacate the state default judgment, the Reussers argued that their failure to appear at the FED proceeding was supported by “good cause” under ORCP 71, due in part to the same alleged misconduct at the heart of the present suit.   The state court denied the Reussers’ motion and therefore left the default judgment intact.The Reussers contend that the state court’s refusal to vacate the default judgment cannot bar federal jurisdiction, because the state court did not specify the precise grounds on which its judgment rested.   Accordingly, they argue, it is possible that the state court denied their motion on a procedural ground, rather than deciding the merits of their claims.   However, the record reveals that the parties did not present a procedural argument before the state court either in their written motions or at the hearing that followed.   While the state court did not cite the specific grounds underlying its denial of the motion, it expressly indicated that its decision was based on its “review[of] the motion and pleadings in support of and opposition to the motion, and having heard argument from counsel,” and when asked at the hearing whether it had any questions concerning the case, the state court responded that it did not.   The only reasonable conclusions are that the state court refused to credit the Reussers’ factual allegations, or that it held that the allegations of “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party,” ORCP 71B(c), were insufficient to permit vacatur of the default judgment.   Thus, even drawing all “reasonable inferences from the complaint” in the Reussers’ favor, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Local 1 v. Stone, 502 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), we must conclude that the state court rejected the claimed extrinsic fraud on the merits.5 Accordingly, the Reussers’ § 1983 claims constitute a de facto appeal of a state court decision and are therefore barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   That is, even assuming that the misconduct that the Reussers allege rises to the level of extrinsic fraud, such claim was itself separately litigated before and rejected by an Oregon state court. – See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1400722.html#sthash.8NiFvIYG.dpuf

n doctrine “applies not only to claims that were actually raised before the state court, but also to claims that are inextricably intertwined with state court determinations.” Id. (citation omitted). A claim filed by a consumer in federal court is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision if “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules . . . .” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). Even a claim by a consumer that the state court judgment was obtained through “extrinsic fraud” is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Kelly case provides an excellent example of how the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can bar an FDCPA claim. There, the plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims alleged that the state court judgments defendants had obtained included sums for attorneys’ fees that were not permitted by contract or law. See Kelley, 548 F.3d at 602. When defendants raised the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, plaintiffs argued their claims were not barred, because they were only challenging “defendants’ representations and requests related to attorney fees, and not the state court judgments granting those requests.” Id. at 604. The Kelly court rejected this argument, noting that the state court had determined the fees were proper, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule that the holding was erroneous:

“Because defendants needed to prevail in state court in order to capitalize on the alleged fraud, the FDCPA claims that plaintiffs bring ultimately require us to evaluate the state court judgments. We could not determine that defendants’ representations and requests related to attorney fees violated the law without determining that the state court erred by issuing judgments granting the attorney fees.”

Id. at 605.

More recently, in Bryant v. Gordon & Wong Group, P.C., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-15401 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010), the plaintiff sued a collection law firm, claiming he had never been served with the complaint in the state court collection action, and that “out of the blue” he discovered his checking and savings accounts had been garnished. See Bryant, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. The court rejected the claim, noting that by “disputing the garnishment of his accounts, Plaintiff is inherently challenging the entry of default against him and the writ of execution that authorized the garnishment.” Id. at 1208. Summary judgment was granted for defendant under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, because plaintiff’s claims were seeking to undermine the judgments entered against him in state court. The court held:

“The net effect is that Plaintiff is seeking to undermine the state court judgments. These judgments were rendered before the current district court proceeding, and any action by this Court in favor of Plaintiff on his claims would necessarily require review of those state court judgments. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine specifically bars this Court from doing so. If Plaintiff believes he has been wronged by the actions of the state court, he must turn to the state for remedy. This Court lacks jurisdiction to provide redress for Plaintiff’s claims.”

Id.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a key defense in cases like Kelly and Bryant, where a consumer is pursuing claims that would undermine the validity of a state court judgment or its findings. The collector should move for summary judgment on the grounds that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. See Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898 (district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if claims raised in federal action are inextricably intertwined with state court decision).

If a consumer has a problem with a state court judgment, he cannot attack the judgment or undermine it using the federal courts. He must seek relief from the judgment utilizing the procedures available under state law. “A state litigant seeking review of a state court judgment must follow the appellate process through the state court system and then directly to the United States Supreme Court.” Kelley, 548 F.3d at 603.

_________________________________________________________________

From: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, May 11, 2016 at 10:37 PM
Subject: Fwd:
To: “*irs. commissioner” <*IRS.Commissioner@irs.gov>, Washington Field <washington.field@ic.fbi.gov>, ASKDOJ <ASKDOJ@usdoj.gov>, “: Division, Criminal” <Criminal.Division@usdoj.gov>, “Doug.Davis” <Doug.Davis@ftb.ca.gov>, Dennis <Dennis@riordan-horgan.com>, MollyHale <MollyHale@ucia.gov>, fsb <fsb@fsb.ru>, rbyucaipa <rbyucaipa@yahoo.com>, khuvane <khuvane@caa.com>, blourd <blourd@caa.com>, Robert MacMillan <robert.macmillan@gmail.com>, a <anderson.cooper@cnn.com>, wennermedia <wennermedia@gmail.com>, Mick Brown <mick.brown@telegraph.co.uk>, “glenn.greenwald” <glenn.greenwald@firstlook.org>, Harriet Ryan <harriet.ryan@latimes.com>, “hailey.branson” <hailey.branson@latimes.com>, Stan Garnett <stan.garnett@gmail.com>, Mike Feuer <mike.feuer@lacity.org>, “mayor.garcetti” <mayor.garcetti@lacity.org>, Opla-pd-los-occ <OPLA-PD-LOS-OCC@ice.dhs.gov>, “Kelly.Sopko” <Kelly.Sopko@tigta.treas.gov>, Whistleblower <whistleblower@judiciary-rep.senate.gov>, Attacheottawa <AttacheOttawa@ci.irs.gov>, tips@radaronline.com, alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>, bruce <bruce@brucecutler.com>

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The Criminal Stalker, Leonard Cohen’s co-conspirator, continues to harass me over my RICO suit. Of course, they are all clear that criminal conduct is a privilege in California. The issue with respect to Cohen’s Complaint is that I was not served. That is first and foremost. Rooker Feldman does not apply to this case. Furthermore, I had every right to address the fact that fraudulent misrepresentations and perjury were used to obtain the January 17, 2014 decision. The court decided to mischaracterize my fraud upon the court motion as a motion to reconsider which it most certainly was not. Cohen and his lawyers then failed, although ordered to do so, to file a signed order by the judge leaving nothing to be appealed. They also submitted legal documents arguing “intrinsic” elements and there is no law in this land that says I must merely sit there and permit myself to be falsely accused particularly in light of the fact that Cohen personally testified that I never stole from him and we were in a purely business relationship – undermining the civil matters and the fraud DMV order. My RICO Complaint addresses egregious fraud upon numerous U.S. District Courts. That is separate and apart from the fact that I was not served Cohen’s lawsuit. I had no opportunity to litigate this matter. Cohen’s decision not to serve me appears to have been intentional. In the alternative, once I brought the failure to serve me to the attention of his lawyers (who refused to address it), Cohen filed his tax returns and applied for/received fraudulent tax refunds. I submitted at least fie declarations to LA Superior Court re. the failure to serve me. These witnesses were all prepared to testify, two attended the January 2014 hearing, and none were permitted to testify. That is not a full and fair hearing. Nothing whatsoever has been litigated. I used diligence in filing my motion to vacate. The fact that Cohen willfully bankrupted me should not be held against me. To this date, I have not been served the Complaint. The stalker threw some unverified document online and that is not service. However, LA Superior Court has a rampant problem with service issues and they refuse to address it. The Court has not twice determined anything because it wrongfully characterized my fraud upon the court motion as a motion to reconsider. The renewal of the fraud default judgment, and Cohen’s attempt to extort millions in financial interest, is under appeal.

Fascinating argument – apart from the fact that I wasn’t served, none of my claims support an exception to Rooker Feldman. As I have said, the court system is willfully disregarding an entire body of law related to fraud, fraudulently obtained default judgments, the willful failure to serve people, and fraud upon the court. There have been no litigation defeats. Nothing was litigated and Cohen’s response to my motion to vacate the complaint was to lie and inform the court I was served. The court itself has informed all parties that the proof of service states that someone else was served.

I didn’t read the so-called complaint until it was posted online in April 2010. The world press has every fact wrong and that is not an appropriate manner in which to inform someone of the allegations against them. It’s obscene. I don’t know what everyone thinks. I know this – LA Superior Court has a rampant problem with service and the court system itself condones the use of fraud, perjury, and misconduct to obtain judgments, verdicts, and orders. I haven’t appealed any matters of law so I am not arguing anything that would qualify as an appeal.

There is also the outstanding issue of Cohen using the fraudulent default judgment to interfere with federal tax matters, render previously filed returns as fraudulent, and obtain fraudulent tax refunds. That issue is not going away – regardless of the lies throughout my so-called 2012 trial about federal tax matters.

Kelley

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 3:23 AM
Subject:
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

You may wish to read Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008, or not, since it vaporizes your argument. It holds that even as to “extrinsic fraud” (e.g., the service issue only) Rooker-Feldman APPLIES where the state court (as in your case) heard and rejected your allegation of extrinsic fraud.

Here, the Reussers allege that Wachovia engaged in two acts of extrinsic fraud.   First, they allege that Wachovia failed to provide sufficient notice of its intent to seek a default judgment against the Reussers, in violation of Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure (“ORCP”) 69A(1).   Second, they allege that Wachovia failed to inform the state trial court that they had been served a copy of the Reussers’ petition contesting the merits of the FED proceeding.   The hitch in both contentions, however, is that they already have been litigated in Oregon state court.   In their motion to vacate the state default judgment, the Reussers argued that their failure to appear at the FED proceeding was supported by “good cause” under ORCP 71, due in part to the same alleged misconduct at the heart of the present suit.   The state court denied the Reussers’ motion and therefore left the default judgment intact.The Reussers contend that the state court’s refusal to vacate the default judgment cannot bar federal jurisdiction, because the state court did not specify the precise grounds on which its judgment rested.   Accordingly, they argue, it is possible that the state court denied their motion on a procedural ground, rather than deciding the merits of their claims.   However, the record reveals that the parties did not present a procedural argument before the state court either in their written motions or at the hearing that followed.   While the state court did not cite the specific grounds underlying its denial of the motion, it expressly indicated that its decision was based on its “review[of] the motion and pleadings in support of and opposition to the motion, and having heard argument from counsel,” and when asked at the hearing whether it had any questions concerning the case, the state court responded that it did not.   The only reasonable conclusions are that the state court refused to credit the Reussers’ factual allegations, or that it held that the allegations of “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party,” ORCP 71B(c), were insufficient to permit vacatur of the default judgment.   Thus, even drawing all “reasonable inferences from the complaint” in the Reussers’ favor, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Local 1 v. Stone, 502 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), we must conclude that the state court rejected the claimed extrinsic fraud on the merits.5 Accordingly, the Reussers’ § 1983 claims constitute a de facto appeal of a state court decision and are therefore barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   That is, even assuming that the misconduct that the Reussers allege rises to the level of extrinsic fraud, such claim was itself separately litigated before and rejected by an Oregon state court. – See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1400722.html#sthash.8NiFvIYG.dpuf

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 4:55 AM
Subject: Hearing 1-17-2014; Alleged “extrinsic fraud” re proof of service ALREADY DECIDED BY STATE COURT; Rooker-Feldman DOES APPLY even to the service issue
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

From the attached TR 1-17-2014

4, lines 1-4 “You also have problems on the merits.”

9.26, line 8 to p. 15, line 1 “Now, you are arguing that the judgment is void because it was based on a false proof of service. […] a declaration by a registered process server is entitled to a presumption of correctness under Evidence Code section 647…and the fact that the process server knocks and gets no answer and the lights are on, inferentially supports that you didn’t answer…well somebody came to the door on this date…somebody came to the door apparently. Now, you know, since you do not have a valid declaration here to establish any evidence, you have a problem…And the Cohen declaration says that a photo take of you the summer of 2006 shows you with blond hair…the restraining order describes you as …blond…you know, not only was there service, but there was delivery to this Jane Doe and it was also mailed. You have not satisfactorily accounted for the mailing. It went to an address you were concededly living at. It was mailed to that address. Now, in addition, there was the request for entry of default which I understand you received by email…in addition, even if you could demonstrate extrinsic fraud and, frankly I don’t think you have demonstrated it, I don’t think you have carried your burden of proof that the declaration of the process server was false. ¶ You cannot show that you acted with diligence. You state that you found out about this action in April of 2010, but you provide absolutely zero explanation [of] why you waited until August 2013 […] you have not demonstrated that the proof of service of summons and complaint was false or indeed even questionable, nor have you shown any entitlement [to] any relief on any equitable basis. […] and I don’t see any diligence and I don’t see a basis for setting this aside, frankly.”

Clearly and without a doubt, you can disagree with Judge Hess’ ruling on January 17, 2014, but you cannot seriously dispute that Judge Hess considered and rejected your contentions that the proof of service was false and that there was “extrinsic fraud” on the merits. Judge Hess simply held that you failed to meet your burden of proving that the proof of service was false, in the face of affirmative evidence that you were indeed served as reflected in the proof of service, by delivery to “Jane Doe” and also with a copy of the suit mailed to the residence you admit you were living in at the time. Judge Hess expressly found at the hearing that you were in fact served.

Therefore, Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008) is right on point.

Essentially, you are not only seeking to overturn the CA judgment in BC338322, you are asking the district court to – in essence – hold that Judge Hess made the WRONG DECISION when he denied your motion to vacate on January 17, 2014 and that Judge Hess made the WRONG DECISION again on June 23, 2015 when he AGAIN denied your (second) request to set the 2006 judgment aside.

That is classic Rooker-Feldman, and the district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 5:14 AM
Subject: FYI; Rooker-Feldman bars federal court claims premised on lack of service; plaintiff must exhaust the state ct. appeals process and then seek review directly from the US Supreme Ct.
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

Friday, May 7, 2010

Using The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine To Defeat federal Claims

As collection attorneys know, consumers often do not pay close attention to the collection process until the creditor already has a judgment and counsel has an order that allows for garnishing the consumer’s wages or attaching their bank accounts. These post-judgment collection efforts can spawn claims in federal court, where the consumers allege they were never served with the state court complaint, or that the state court judgment against them is somehow improper. Claims of this type, however, are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and are doomed to fail.

What exactly is the Rooker-Feldman doctrine anyway? As the Supreme Court recently observed, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents litigants from attacking a state court judgment by filing a subsequent federal lawsuit, “no matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be. (citations). Kelly v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “applies not only to claims that were actually raised before the state court, but also to claims that are inextricably intertwined with state court determinations.” Id. (citation omitted). A claim filed by a consumer in federal court is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision if “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules . . . .” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). Even a claim by a consumer that the state court judgment was obtained through “extrinsic fraud” is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Kelly case provides an excellent example of how the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can bar an FDCPA claim. There, the plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims alleged that the state court judgments defendants had obtained included sums for attorneys’ fees that were not permitted by contract or law. See Kelley, 548 F.3d at 602. When defendants raised the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, plaintiffs argued their claims were not barred, because they were only challenging “defendants’ representations and requests related to attorney fees, and not the state court judgments granting those requests.” Id. at 604. The Kelly court rejected this argument, noting that the state court had determined the fees were proper, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule that the holding was erroneous:

“Because defendants needed to prevail in state court in order to capitalize on the alleged fraud, the FDCPA claims that plaintiffs bring ultimately require us to evaluate the state court judgments. We could not determine that defendants’ representations and requests related to attorney fees violated the law without determining that the state court erred by issuing judgments granting the attorney fees.”

Id. at 605.

More recently, in Bryant v. Gordon & Wong Group, P.C., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-15401 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010), the plaintiff sued a collection law firm, claiming he had never been served with the complaint in the state court collection action, and that “out of the blue” he discovered his checking and savings accounts had been garnished. See Bryant, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. The court rejected the claim, noting that by “disputing the garnishment of his accounts, Plaintiff is inherently challenging the entry of default against him and the writ of execution that authorized the garnishment.” Id. at 1208. Summary judgment was granted for defendant under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, because plaintiff’s claims were seeking to undermine the judgments entered against him in state court. The court held:

“The net effect is that Plaintiff is seeking to undermine the state court judgments. These judgments were rendered before the current district court proceeding, and any action by this Court in favor of Plaintiff on his claims would necessarily require review of those state court judgments. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine specifically bars this Court from doing so. If Plaintiff believes he has been wronged by the actions of the state court, he must turn to the state for remedy. This Court lacks jurisdiction to provide redress for Plaintiff’s claims.”

Id.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a key defense in cases like Kelly and Bryant, where a consumer is pursuing claims that would undermine the validity of a state court judgment or its findings. The collector should move for summary judgment on the grounds that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. See Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898 (district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if claims raised in federal action are inextricably intertwined with state court decision).

If a consumer has a problem with a state court judgment, he cannot attack the judgment or undermine it using the federal courts. He must seek relief from the judgment utilizing the procedures available under state law. “A state litigant seeking review of a state court judgment must follow the appellate process through the state court system and then directly to the United States Supreme Court.” Kelley, 548 F.3d at 603.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 3:23 AM
Subject:
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

You may wish to read Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008, or not, since it vaporizes your argument. It holds that even as to “extrinsic fraud” (e.g., the service issue only) Rooker-Feldman APPLIES where the state court (as in your case) heard and rejected your allegation of extrinsic fraud.

Here, the Reussers allege that Wachovia engaged in two acts of extrinsic fraud.   First, they allege that Wachovia failed to provide sufficient notice of its intent to seek a default judgment against the Reussers, in violation of Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure (“ORCP”) 69A(1).   Second, they allege that Wachovia failed to inform the state trial court that they had been served a copy of the Reussers’ petition contesting the merits of the FED proceeding.   The hitch in both contentions, however, is that they already have been litigated in Oregon state court.   In their motion to vacate the state default judgment, the Reussers argued that their failure to appear at the FED proceeding was supported by “good cause” under ORCP 71, due in part to the same alleged misconduct at the heart of the present suit.   The state court denied the Reussers’ motion and therefore left the default judgment intact.The Reussers contend that the state court’s refusal to vacate the default judgment cannot bar federal jurisdiction, because the state court did not specify the precise grounds on which its judgment rested.   Accordingly, they argue, it is possible that the state court denied their motion on a procedural ground, rather than deciding the merits of their claims.   However, the record reveals that the parties did not present a procedural argument before the state court either in their written motions or at the hearing that followed.   While the state court did not cite the specific grounds underlying its denial of the motion, it expressly indicated that its decision was based on its “review[of] the motion and pleadings in support of and opposition to the motion, and having heard argument from counsel,” and when asked at the hearing whether it had any questions concerning the case, the state court responded that it did not.   The only reasonable conclusions are that the state court refused to credit the Reussers’ factual allegations, or that it held that the allegations of “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party,” ORCP 71B(c), were insufficient to permit vacatur of the default judgment.   Thus, even drawing all “reasonable inferences from the complaint” in the Reussers’ favor, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Local 1 v. Stone, 502 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), we must conclude that the state court rejected the claimed extrinsic fraud on the merits.5 Accordingly, the Reussers’ § 1983 claims constitute a de facto appeal of a state court decision and are therefore barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   That is, even assuming that the misconduct that the Reussers allege rises to the level of extrinsic fraud, such claim was itself separately litigated before and rejected by an Oregon state court. – See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1400722.html#sthash.8NiFvIYG.dpuf

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 4:55 AM
Subject: Hearing 1-17-2014; Alleged “extrinsic fraud” re proof of service ALREADY DECIDED BY STATE COURT; Rooker-Feldman DOES APPLY even to the service issue
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

From the attached TR 1-17-2014

TRANSCRIPT OF THE 1-17-2014 HEARING ON MOTION TO VACATE IN COHEN V. LYNCH CASE NO. BC338322 POSTED BY KELLEY LYNCH ON SCRIBD.COM

4, lines 1-4 “You also have problems on the merits.”

9.26, line 8 to p. 15, line 1 “Now, you are arguing that the judgment is void because it was based on a false proof of service. […] a declaration by a registered process server is entitled to a presumption of correctness under Evidence Code section 647…and the fact that the process server knocks and gets no answer and the lights are on, inferentially supports that you didn’t answer…well somebody came to the door on this date…somebody came to the door apparently. Now, you know, since you do not have a valid declaration here to establish any evidence, you have a problem…And the Cohen declaration says that a photo take of you the summer of 2006 shows you with blond hair…the restraining order describes you as …blond…you know, not only was there service, but there was delivery to this Jane Doe and it was also mailed. You have not satisfactorily accounted for the mailing. It went to an address you were concededly living at. It was mailed to that address. Now, in addition, there was the request for entry of default which I understand you received by email…in addition, even if you could demonstrate extrinsic fraud and, frankly I don’t think you have demonstrated it, I don’t think you have carried your burden of proof that the declaration of the process server was false. ¶ You cannot show that you acted with diligence. You state that you found out about this action in April of 2010, but you provide absolutely zero explanation [of] why you waited until August 2013 […] you have not demonstrated that the proof of service of summons and complaint was false or indeed even questionable, nor have you shown any entitlement [to] any relief on any equitable basis. […] and I don’t see any diligence and I don’t see a basis for setting this aside, frankly.”

Clearly and without a doubt, you can disagree with Judge Hess’ ruling on January 17, 2014, but you cannot seriously dispute that Judge Hess considered and rejected your contentions that the proof of service was false and that there was “extrinsic fraud” on the merits. Judge Hess simply held that you failed to meet your burden of proving that the proof of service was false, in the face of affirmative evidence that you were indeed served as reflected in the proof of service, by delivery to “Jane Doe” and also with a copy of the suit mailed to the residence you admit you were living in at the time. Judge Hess expressly found at the hearing that you were in fact served.

Therefore, Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008) is right on point.

Essentially, you are not only seeking to overturn the CA judgment in BC338322, you are asking the district court to – in essence – hold that Judge Hess made the WRONG DECISION when he denied your motion to vacate on January 17, 2014 and that Judge Hess made the WRONG DECISION again on June 23, 2015 when he AGAIN denied your (second) request to set the 2006 judgment aside.

That is classic Rooker-Feldman, and the district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 5:14 AM
Subject: FYI; Rooker-Feldman bars federal court claims premised on lack of service; plaintiff must exhaust the state ct. appeals process and then seek review directly from the US Supreme Ct.
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

Friday, May 7, 2010

Using The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine To Defeat federal Claims

As collection attorneys know, consumers often do not pay close attention to the collection process until the creditor already has a judgment and counsel has an order that allows for garnishing the consumer’s wages or attaching their bank accounts. These post-judgment collection efforts can spawn claims in federal court, where the consumers allege they were never served with the state court complaint, or that the state court judgment against them is somehow improper. Claims of this type, however, are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and are doomed to fail.

What exactly is the Rooker-Feldman doctrine anyway? As the Supreme Court recently observed, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents litigants from attacking a state court judgment by filing a subsequent federal lawsuit, “no matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be. (citations). Kelly v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “applies not only to claims that were actually raised before the state court, but also to claims that are inextricably intertwined with state court determinations.” Id. (citation omitted). A claim filed by a consumer in federal court is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision if “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules . . . .” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). Even a claim by a consumer that the state court judgment was obtained through “extrinsic fraud” is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Kelly case provides an excellent example of how the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can bar an FDCPA claim. There, the plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims alleged that the state court judgments defendants had obtained included sums for attorneys’ fees that were not permitted by contract or law. See Kelley, 548 F.3d at 602. When defendants raised the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, plaintiffs argued their claims were not barred, because they were only challenging “defendants’ representations and requests related to attorney fees, and not the state court judgments granting those requests.” Id. at 604. The Kelly court rejected this argument, noting that the state court had determined the fees were proper, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule that the holding was erroneous:

“Because defendants needed to prevail in state court in order to capitalize on the alleged fraud, the FDCPA claims that plaintiffs bring ultimately require us to evaluate the state court judgments. We could not determine that defendants’ representations and requests related to attorney fees violated the law without determining that the state court erred by issuing judgments granting the attorney fees.”

Id. at 605.

More recently, in Bryant v. Gordon & Wong Group, P.C., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-15401 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010), the plaintiff sued a collection law firm, claiming he had never been served with the complaint in the state court collection action, and that “out of the blue” he discovered his checking and savings accounts had been garnished. See Bryant, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. The court rejected the claim, noting that by “disputing the garnishment of his accounts, Plaintiff is inherently challenging the entry of default against him and the writ of execution that authorized the garnishment.” Id. at 1208. Summary judgment was granted for defendant under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, because plaintiff’s claims were seeking to undermine the judgments entered against him in state court. The court held:

“The net effect is that Plaintiff is seeking to undermine the state court judgments. These judgments were rendered before the current district court proceeding, and any action by this Court in favor of Plaintiff on his claims would necessarily require review of those state court judgments. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine specifically bars this Court from doing so. If Plaintiff believes he has been wronged by the actions of the state court, he must turn to the state for remedy. This Court lacks jurisdiction to provide redress for Plaintiff’s claims.”

Id.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a key defense in cases like Kelly and Bryant, where a consumer is pursuing claims that would undermine the validity of a state court judgment or its findings. The collector should move for summary judgment on the grounds that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. See Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898 (district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if claims raised in federal action are inextricably intertwined with state court decision).

If a consumer has a problem with a state court judgment, he cannot attack the judgment or undermine it using the federal courts. He must seek relief from the judgment utilizing the procedures available under state law. “A state litigant seeking review of a state court judgment must follow the appellate process through the state court system and then directly to the United States Supreme Court.” Kelley, 548 F.3d at 603.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, May 12, 2016 at 8:11 AM
Subject: Your blog posted email dated Wed, May 11, 2016 at 1:56 PM
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

Ms. Lynch,

You write:

“I find Gianelli’s interpretation of Rooker Feldman moronic.” (Unfortunately for you, you filed in the 9thCircuit, which agrees with methat Rooker-Feldman DOES apply even to federal actions seeking to set aside a state court judgment based on alleged “extrinsic fraud” where (as in your case on January 17, 2014) the allegation of “fraud” was raised in the state court through a motion to vacate and was denied –see Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008); also see the attached hearing transcript reflecting Judge Hess’ ruling that your claim of “extrinsic fraud” based on an alleged “false proof of service” was without merit and finding that you were in fact served, i.e. Hess denied your “extrinsic fraud” claim on its merits.)

“If [the federal district court] has the audacity to dismiss this case, it will be appealed.” (Excuse me, but appealed to what court exactly? The 9thCircuit Court of Appeals, that just last month dismissed your appealfrom the December 29, 2015 tax court order dismissing that proceeding as “frivolous”? Not unless you are prepared to pony up a $500 filing fee, you are not! Audacity? My God, you are so very clueless. Dismissing your prolix, meritless, and time-barred RICO suit will not be an act of “audacity” it will be Judge Wilson and/or Magistrate Feldman’s DUTY to do so, since Rooker-Feldman is only one of many fatal defects in your filing, none of which can be cured by amendment.)

As you know, I write for myself alone.

_________________________________________________________________

From: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2010@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, May 11, 2016 at 1:56 PM
Subject: The Criminal Stalker
To: “*IRS.Commisioner” <*IRS.Commisioner@irs.gov>, Washington Field <washington.field@ic.fbi.gov>, ASKDOJ <ASKDOJ@usdoj.gov>, “Division, Criminal” <Criminal.Division@usdoj.gov>, “Doug.Davis” <Doug.Davis@ftb.ca.gov>, Dennis <Dennis@riordan-horgan.com>, MollyHale <MollyHale@ucia.gov>, fsb <fsb@fsb.ru>, rbyucaipa <rbyucaipa@yahoo.com>, khuvane <khuvane@caa.com>, blourd <blourd@caa.com>, Robert MacMillan <robert.macmillan@gmail.com>, a <anderson.cooper@cnn.com>, wennermedia <wennermedia@gmail.com>, Mick Brown <mick.brown@telegraph.co.uk>, “glenn.greenwald” <glenn.greenwald@firstlook.org>, Harriet Ryan <harriet.ryan@latimes.com>, “hailey.branson” <hailey.branson@latimes.com>, Stan Garnett <stan.garnett@gmail.com>, Mike Feuer <mike.feuer@lacity.org>, “mayor.garcetti” <mayor.garcetti@lacity.org>, Opla-pd-los-occ <OPLA-PD-LOS-OCC@ice.dhs.gov>, “Kelly.Sopko” <Kelly.Sopko@tigta.treas.gov>, Whistleblower <whistleblower@judiciary-rep.senate.gov>, Attacheottawa <AttacheOttawa@ci.irs.gov>, tips@radaronline.com, alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>, bruce <bruce@brucecutler.com>

IRS, FBI, and DOJ,

The Stalker has decided to bombard me with emails about my federal RICO suit. He is lying when he says that I am emailing him. He is emailing me – including about his Mexican holiday with his wife – and has now created a new email moniker, Urgyen Trinley Dorje, with which to harass me with. That is the name of one of the two 17th Karmapas. Gianelli creates email monikers related to my teachers, the 17th Karmapa and 14th Sharmapa. For example, the emails this criminal has sent from the 14th Sheepdog and 17th Shitzu fake email moniker accounts. The stalker also continues to visit my riverdeepbook.blogspot.com blog and then harasses me over posts there. That would include, but is not limited to, posts that represent my email communications with IRS, FBI, and DOJ.

What is on this criminal’s mind at this time? RICO. The criminal stalker, a legal representative of Leonard Cohen’s, is now obsessed with my RICO suit, writing legal opinions, arguing in defense of Leonard Cohen, and so forth. I think the Criminal Stalker would like to know how many individuals are reading my blogs. Well, it’s hundreds of thousands of people from around the world. What managed email account is the stalker writing about? His wife’s? Why did the criminal stalker copy me on emails – where his wife was included – regarding his trip to Mexico, etc? The situation remains entirely creepy.

I find Gianelli’s interpretation of Rooker Feldman moronic. However, Leonard Cohen and his lawyers have an answer for everything: theft, copyright infringement, false arrest, perjury, fraud, tax fraud, etc. The system works beautifully for criminals. I have indeed mentioned Gianellli’s name throughout my Complaint. The reason for that is he is Leonard Cohen’s operative, proxy, co-conspirator, and has terrorized my sons and others for approximately seven straight years. I personally believe the court should take that seriously. My argument that there is egregious fraud upon the court in Colorado is not premised solely on the fact that the California judgment is evidence of fraud and theft. There is fraud upon that Court, Rice had my address changed, I was served nothing in that case after I was evicted, etc, and I explained to Judge Babcock my grave concerns about criminal tax fraud. Leonard Cohen’s argument is this: he got away with it in his mind.

The state court judgments are products of fraud and that’s an exemption re. Rooker-Feldman. The 9th Circuit is clear about that fact. LA Superior Court had no jurisdiction to enter the fraud judgment. I believe there is ample evidence before the federal court that I wasn’t served. That would include the declarations of Joan Lynch, John Rutger Penick, Clea Surkhang, Palden Ronge, Daniel Meade, and Paulette Brandt. There is a fraud exemption to Rooker-Feldman even if the criminal stalker argues that there is not. My reliance on Chevron has nothing whatsoever to do with Rooker-Feldman. Chevron and my cases are similar in that a fraud judgment was used for the purposes of extortion and with respect to the tactics used. Chevron relied on Hazel-Atlas as do I. It is irrelevant if the corrupt persuasion involves submitting fraudulent and fabricated evidence to a judge or bribing a judge. It seems as though the entire body of law re. fraud is irrelevant in the minds of many courts, Leonard Cohen and his lawyers, and – of course – the criminal stalker.

It would be difficult to “relitigate” something that was never litigated in the first place. If this court has the audacity to dismiss this case, it will be appealed. Make no mistake about that. This court system was not created so that criminals with motive can use it to destroy the lives of others, steal from them, and protect themselves from their own criminal conduct. This case will also go to the U.S. Supreme Court because I think the courts are ignoring fraud upon the court, fraudulently obtained judgments, and an entire body of law related to those matters. I also happen to think that egregiously harms the taxpayers.

Does the stalker want to talk about my copyright infringement claim? Rooker Feldman has a fraud exemption. The agreements are not oral and the non-revocable assignments, etc. were submitted to the court. The transfer of ownership of the copyrighted materials was set forth in writing and that’s why the court has the non-revocable assignments. The 2006 judgment is silent as to the intellectual property. In October 2015, Rice informed LA Superior Court that the assets are “out there.” I have no idea where but intend to find out. Furthermore, the copyright infringement matter is a federal issue – not a state court issue. The fact that Cohen and his lawyers transferred the property of suspended corporations to Leonard Cohen (and possibly his wholly owned LCI) is also a very serious issue.

I have no idea why the stalker is writing about my false arrests. I didn’t argue that as an issue. It is part of the scheme to defraud, discredit, destroy, and extort. Evidently criminal conduct is entirely privileged in California. I find that offensive. The false arrests were nothing other than criminal witness tampering and an attempt to obstruct justice. LAPD’s report is entirely clear: my emails were generally requests for tax information that I still do not have although the prosecutor and her witnesses lied about this throughout the trial.

Gianelli’s subject lines are meant to mislead. He is not copied on the emails he is referencing. For instance, email to the “IRS/FBI, Blah, Blah, Blah” with Alan Hootnick copied. He’s merely referring to an email posted to my blog. I wasn’t served Leonard Cohen’s lawsuit. Service is not a criminal throwing up an unverified document online. It also does not involve purchasing a copy of the Complaint. Gianelli, of course, also wants to discuss Phil Spector. He has no one who is in contact with Phil Spector and lies publicly that I’ve never heard from Mr. Spector while he has been incarcerated. He simply wants to see the communications which he is not entitled to see as he doesn’t know me or Phil Spector. Why shouldn’t the court listen to the interview with Truth Sentinel? The questions and answers are relevant and material.

The criminal, Stephen Gianelli, who has terrorized my sons and attempts to intimidate witnesses continues on with his crusade. He is a member of Cohen’s legal defense team and attempts to elicit information about Phil Spector. That is entirely clear.

Kelley

________________________________________________________________

From: Urgyen.Trinley.Dorje <sender@5ymail.com>
Date: Mon, May 9, 2016 at 10:00 PM
Subject: Your RICO suit against Leonard Cohen
To: kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com
We regret to inform you that your RICO complaint will be short lived (what is it the lawyers say? “DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE”).

Kelley, you didn’t really think that you could magically undue every adverse consequence you experienced since “parting ways” with Leonard Cohen in Octobelr of 2005 by simply filing a 250 page peice of paper with the federal district court, did you?

Have you looked at the attachments to your complaint? Cohen sued you in August of 2005. Declarations you claim are full of “perjury” and their transmission to the Los Angeles Superior Court occured MORE THAN 10-years prior to the date you filed your complaint.

There are no do-overs in life, Kelley.

Urgyen Trinley Dorje

From: Urgyen.Trinley.Dorje <sender@5ymail.com>
Date: Tue, May 10, 2016 at 1:21 AM
Subject: Your spam emails
To: kelley.lynch.2010@gmail.com
Your four blog followers can read them on your blog if they wish (YAWN) but the people you cc’d with your latest spam-o-gram have all blocked and/or are ignoring you, Oh, and the spouse you THINK you are emaling does not manage, read, or see the email account you are spamming and never has seen a single email from you. Remember these words my little dukkh-in-the-ass: DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Urgyen Trinley Dorje

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, May 11, 2016 at 1:07 PM
Subject:
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

My “interpretation” of Rooker-Feldman is VERBATIM from controlling case authorities.

But no matter. In a few days the court will rule down the line and agree with my analysis in every single respect.

It’s that obvious.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, May 11, 2016 at 5:10 AM
Subject: Legal reality
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

You continue to email me. Additionally, you mention my name throughout your prolix 250 page RICO complaint as an alleged “co-conspirator”. Apparently, you won’t be ignored. Fine.

I have extensively laid out for you the various legal principles that are fatal to your federal suit – citing statutes and cases that you could have easily looked up and read for yourself – months before you file it. Statute of limitations, res judicata, Rooker Feldman, and the federal court pleading requirements imposed by the Supreme Court.

Clearly, your complaint is primarily focused on prior litigation proceedings taking place between August of 2005 and October of 2008. Moreover, your contention that “fraud” was committed in connection with the Colorado federal court proceedings in the Agile litigation is premised on the assumption that the May, 2006 California judgment in BC338322 is “fraudulent”, the product of “perjury” and should be set aside.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate if the federal plaintiff seeks to overturn a state judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005). The doctrine “is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 284.

You initiated the instant federal proceedings to attack collaterally and to seek enjoinment of a preexisting state judgment in BC338322. present claims arise from the state court proceedings and are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s judgment–i.e., reversal of the state court’s judgment would be a necessary part of the relief requested by you district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review his claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 291; Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 1995). Indeed, not only is your complaint “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s judgment in BC338322, you expressly ask the district court to set it aside! There can be no doubt – none – that Rooker-Feldman applies.

Although you contend that the California judgment was procured through “fraud”, “there is no such thing as a ‘fraud exception’” to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Truong v. Bank of America, N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 384 n.6 (5th Cir. 2013).)

For these reasons alone your suit will be dismissed. Rooker-Feldman deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction to even entertain it.

Your reliance on Chevron v. Donziger is misplaced. Rooker-Feldman applies only to state court judgments, not to foreign judgments, as in Chevron v. Donziger, setting aside the lack of a $500,000 bribe to a judge in connection with the entry of the 2006 judgment.

There are the other fatal defects I mentioned (including the statute of limitations –See Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2001)

(RICO claims have a four-year statute of limitations, which begins to run when a plaintiff knows or should have known of the injury underlying his action).

You may NOT relitigate a state court judgment in federal court, period.

You may not address damages flowing from a 2006 judgment by suing for RICO in 2016 – ten years later (even if you only learned of it in 2010 as you claim in the papers attached to your RICO suit). It is time barred.

Filing papers in court, even declarations you know claim to be perjurious, is not “racketeering activity” without more (e.g., the type of corruption plausibly pleaded then proven in Chevron v. Donziger.)

Under these circumstances, me pointing these things out is not “harassment” nor is it “lying”. It is simply legal reality, a legal reality that will be confirmed in a matter of days (not months) when the district court dismisses your RICO complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 USC § 1915 (e).

After that, IF you can afford a $500 filing fee, you can appeal the judgment of dismissal to the 9th Circuit court of appeal, which court will affirm the order dismissing your case.

It’s just that simple.

The fact that you don’t like the rules of jurisprudence, developed in this country over decades for very important policy reasons that you could not even begin to appreciate, is completely irrelevant to the legal reality of your situation.

Now, kindly shut up until the district court confirms my prior analysis.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, May 11, 2016 at 8:30 AM
Subject: Copyright infringement claim
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

I have already demonstrated the reasons why your federal suit – which relies on the invalidity of the 2006 judgment – must be dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. I also note that you have a copyright infringement claim, based on your claim of an ORAL agreement with your former employer to assign you 15% of his intellectual property “in perpetuity”.

Under federal copyright law, the transfer of an ownership interest in copyrighted material must set forth in a writing, signed by the grantor (Cohen) and describing the interest to be transferred. (17 USC § 201 (d) (2), 204 (a).)

Under California law, a contract that cannot be performed in one year or less (“in perpetuity”) must be in a writing, signed by the party to be bound (Cohen).

Unless the 2006 judgment in BC338322 is in effect set aside by the district court (which is may not be under Rooker-Feldman), a principle of res judicata known as “issue preclusion” would stand in the way of any claim by you that you are entitled to any interest in any intellectual property owned by Cohen, since the declaratory relief portion of the judgment expressly finds otherwise.

For all of these reasons, your copyright infringement claim is a non-starter, meaning it must be dismissed with prejudice along with the rest of your claims.

The analysis is really very simple.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, May 11, 2016 at 9:27 AM
Subject: State law false arrest claim
To: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

Setting aside the fact that a criminal conviction (which establishes for res judicata purposes that you were guilty of the crime for which you were arrested beyond a reasonable doubt – way more proof than required to meet the “probable cause” standard for a valid arrest – as well as the fact that a victim’s report to police that an alleged crime has been committed is absolutely privileged under California Civil Code § 47, you are aware, aren’t you, that the California statute of limitations to sue for false arrest is TWO YEARS from the date of the arrest? (See Cal. Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1.)

It’s simple math: Arrested in 2012 + two years = deadline to sue expiring in 2014, meaning that (in addition to other fatal defects in your state law false arrest claim against the RICO defendants) your claim is TIME BARRED.

Again, the analysis is very simple.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 1, 2016 at 10:21 PM
Subject: Kelley Lynch dated Sun, May 1, 2016 at 12:16 PM to the IRS/FBI Blah, Blah, Blah
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: alan hootnick <ahootnick@yahoo.com>

You write: “For the record, I still haven’t been served Leonard Cohen’s lawsuit so the argument that I knew about it in April 2010 is absurd.”

Ms. Lynch, have you even read your own complaint? You ADMIT that you knew about Cohen’s lawsuit AND the default judgment against you (not to mention the declarations filed in support of the default J) no later than April of 2010 when I posted them on Scribd.com.

You also attach hearing transcripts from 2014 and 2015 before Judge Hess wherein he specifically references that admission by you, and holds that you have failed to adequately explain your delay in filing a motion to vacate the default J from 2010 to October of 2013. He also references the fact that you delayed from January of 2014 (when the first motion was denied) more than a year until 2015 to file your second motion asking for an order vacating the default J.

The issue is not the validity of the J, it is the RICO statute of limitations of four years, which if your discovery of the damage caused by the default J was in 2010, expired in 2014. Meaning, you cannot save the complaint by amendment. Meaning, it will be dismissed WITH PREJUDICE.

PS: I forwarded an email I just received from my friend who speaks to Phil Spector frequently. He cut off all contact with you in 2004 and has instructed prison staff not to forward your letters to him. He has never responded to you. He “doesn’t even want to hear your name”.

You are utterly clueless about how others perceive you.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 1, 2016 at 11:22 AM
Subject: Kelley Lynch email dated Sat, Apr 30, 2016 at 12:14 PM
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>
Cc: blind <distribution@gmail.com>

Ms. Lynch,

You write to the FBI (and your other typical cc recipients):

“Gianelli is not the judge and his interpretations of RICO, Rooker Feldman, etc. are moronic and misleading.”

That is what I love about litigation. We will know PRECISELY whether my views on the merits of your RICO filing are “moronic”, or, on the other hand are spot-on as soon as there is an order following the Court’s section 1915 (e) merits review.

No more BS, not more bluster.

I was either wrong (“moronic” as you put it) or I was quite right.

Perhaps after being spot-on in analyzing the merits of your legal filings on 10 prior occasions I am wrong this time.

Hope, as they say, springs eternal, but the law I quoted to you is crystal clear and there is no way you will be allowed to proceed with a suit to invalidate a California state court default judgment entered against you 10-years ago on grounds of intrinsic fraud or “perjury” allegedly employed to procure it – for all of the many reasons I cited to you chapter and verse.

And no, it is not appropriate to expect the Court to listen to several hours of podcast interviews by you and your housemate about Leonard Cohen and Phil Spector when deciding whether your complaint has facial merit. In fact, your suggestion to the contrary is absurd.

Finally, since it is obvious that, in view of the four year statute of limitations under the civil RICO statute, your complaint cannot be saved by amendment, I predict that you will NOT be given an opportunity to amend. It will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Since the gravamen of your suit is that a theft was perpetrated against you using a “fraudulent” and corruptly obtained judgment in 2006, which judgment you admit you knew about no later than April of 2010, there can be no doubt at all that your RICO suit is time-barred.

Stephen Gianelli

Writing for myself alone.

From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 1, 2016 at 1:07 AM
Subject:
To: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>

“The district court properly dismissed Wooten’s Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim because Wooten failed to allege with

sufficient particularity a pattern of racketeering activity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)

(allegations of fraud must be “state[d] with particularity”); Lancaster Cmty. Hosp.

Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir. 1991) (Rule 9(b)’s

requirements apply to allegations regarding fraudulent predicate acts in RICO

claims). Moreover, the district court correctly found that Wooten’s RICO claim

was untimely. See Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2001)

(RICO claims have a four-year statute of limitations, which begins to run when a

plaintiff knows or should have known of the injury underlying his action).”

The injury underlying your action is alleged to be lost “commissions”, “intellectual property”, “royalties”, and shares in specified business entities. Arguably, that damage first occurred upon your separation from Leonard Cohen’s employ, when he either failed within a reasonable time (or refused) to provide you with that money and property.

But certainly it was abundantly clear to you by the time your home was foreclosed, you were required to move, you had no money to find alternative housing, and you were required to “live on the beach in Santa Monica for eight months” (see Truth Sentential interview “transcript”) that you had suffered this alleged business injury.

Stephen Gianelli

Writing for myself alone.

Attached: Wooten v. Countrywide (9th Circuit)

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